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Abstract
We present a novel mechanism that explains how nonenforceable communication about future
actions has the capacity to improve efficiency. We explore a two-player partnership game where each
player, before choosing a level of effort to exert on a joint project, makes a cheap talk promise to his
partner about his own future effort. We allow agents to incur a psychological cost of reneging on their
promises. We demonstrate a strong tendency for evolutionary processes to select agents who incur
intermediate costs of reneging, and show that these costs induce second-best optimal outcomes.
Keywords: Promises, strategic complements, lying costs, input games, partnership games.
JEL Classification: C73, D03, D83.
1 Introduction
Communication about future actions in joint projects is pervasive in the household, within and between
firms, in political processes, and in casual day-to-day interactions. Often, agents can make statements
about their intentions, both as a means of coordination and as a promise. Frequently, they are not
contractually bound by these statements and have an incentive to make false promises and renege upon
them when choosing how to act. Nevertheless, agents in such circumstances commonly use communica-
tion to carry out courses of action that yield a higher payoff to each than would be expected if agents
could make and break promises at no direct cost (cheap talk). Consider, for example, two coauthors
initiating a project and making promises about the number of hours they will separately work on it in
the following year, or countries making commitments to reduce regional levels of pollution.
Our two key contributions are as follows. First, we present a novel theoretical foundation for the
prevalence of intermediate psychological costs of breaking promises (reneging). Second, we demonstrate
that these endogenously determined intermediate psychological costs yield second-best optimal outcomes
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in an important class of strategic interactions. Taken together, these contributions present a novel
explanation for the way in which preplay communication can foster cooperation in one-shot strategic
interactions when agents’ interests are only partially aligned.
The possibility of repeated interaction with a partner means that reputational concerns could mo-
tivate agents to keep their promises, even when this does not maximise their payoff in the present
encounter. However, the experimental evidence discussed in Section 2, and indeed much of daily experi-
ence, demonstrates that agents are motivated to some extent to keep their word even in one-off encounters
and suggests a direct concern for keeping promises. In this paper, we put reputational concerns to one
side and consider this second, direct motivation for promise-keeping.
We study a class of partnership games (also known as input games; see, e.g., Holmstrom, 1982;
Cooper & John, 1988) with preplay communication. In the setting we examine, agents simultaneously
communicate promised levels of effort, and, following this, they simultaneously choose their levels of effort
from an interval. Agents experience a direct convex cost of their effort, and a benefit which is increasing
in both their own effort and that of their partner, such that effort choices are strategic complements.
Agents always have an incentive to slightly “undercut” (exert less effort than) their partner so that when
talk is cheap, the only subgame perfect equilibrium of the game involves both agents choosing zero effort.
However, this outcome is Pareto-dominated by outcomes in which players exert effort.
We explore the impact of introducing into this setting a cost of reneging on promises. Specifically, we
assume that each agent experiences a convex psychological cost of the distance between their promised
and actual effort. Each player’s level of reneging cost is parameterised by his level of reneging aversion.
This reneging cost can be seen as representing the guilt or bad feeling that agents experience when going
back on promises they have made. The subjective utility of each agent is equal to his material payoff
(which depends only on the agents’ effort choices) minus his reneging cost. Reneging aversion transforms
what is ordinarily modeled as a cheap talk promise into a partially self-enforcing commitment.
We characterise the perfect equilibria of the partnership game with reneging costs. The game admits
an essentially unique perfect equilibrium, the properties of which depend on the players’ levels of reneging
aversion. One of the main insights of the paper is that if both players have either very high or very low
levels of reneging aversion then efforts are zero in equilibrium and promises play no role in promoting
efficiency, but if both players have intermediate levels of reneging aversion they will promise and exert
effort. The reason for this is that when both players have low levels of reneging aversion, they are very
willing to go back on their promises and “undercut” their partner when choosing their level of effort and
so neither is willing to promise to exert effort. When both players have sufficiently high levels of reneging
aversion, they have little flexibility in their second round choice of effort. Knowing that they will have
to exert effort close to what they promise, and that the same is true of their partner, both agents seek
to “undercut” each other’s promises, leading to no effort being promised or exerted in equilibrium.
When both players have intermediate levels of reneging aversion, they promise and exert effort.
Intuitively, a player is willing to strategically promise high effort if and only if (1) he has sufficiently large
reneging aversion that his promises are credible and (2) his partner has sufficiently low reneging aversion
that he can react to the player’s credible promise of high effort by exerting more effort himself. This
implies that both agents are induced to promise high effort if and only if both players’ levels of reneging
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aversion are neither too low nor too high. The highest symmetric level of reneging aversion consistent
with both players making maximal promises has several appealing properties. This intermediate level
of reneging aversion induces the best equilibrium outcome among all symmetric partnership games (and
this outcome converges to the first best as the cost of effort converges to zero). The outcome is also
better than that induced in a “Stackelberg” equilibrium without reneging costs (i.e., the equilibrium
when effort levels are chosen sequentially), if the cost of effort is not too high.
We provide an evolutionary grounding for the emergence and stability of this intermediate level
of reneging aversion by studying the endogenous determination of players’ levels of reneging aversion.
We consider an infinite population of players in which each player is endowed with a level of reneging
aversion. Players are uniformly randomly matched into pairs, and both observe their partner’s level
of reneging aversion before starting the two-stage partnership game described above and receiving the
equilibrium payoffs. A gradual process of learning (or imitation of successful agents) makes levels of
reneging aversion that induce higher payoffs to their agents become more frequent in the population.
We show that the homogeneous population state in which all agents have the same intermediate level of
reneging aversion is a strict equilibrium of the population game, which implies that it is evolutionarily
stable. Moreover, there does not exist any other symmetric pure equilibrium of the population game,
which implies that there exists no other symmetric homogeneous stable state. This demonstrates the
strong tendency of evolutionary processes to select for agents who incur intermediate reneging costs. In
variants and extensions of our main model, we show that our main conclusions are robust to allowing for
sequential communication of promises, “one-sided” reneging costs (i.e. when there is no reneging cost if
exerting more effort than promised), fixed reneging costs, and a more general form of utility function.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses the related literature and the contributions
made by this paper. Section 3 presents our model and analyses partnership games. Section 4 shows
the appealing properties of intermediate reneging aversion. In Section 5 we discuss the evolutionary
stability of intermediate reneging aversion. Section 6 describes the robustness of our main results to the
relaxation of various assumptions in our model. We conclude in Section 7. All the appendices appear
in the online supplementary material. The formal definition of a trembling-hand perfect equilibrium
with a continuum of strategies is presented in Appendix A. We discuss a few technical aspects of our
evolutionary interpretation in Appendix B. Additional illustrative figures are presented in Appendix C.
Our extensions are formally presented in Appendix D. Formal proofs appear in Appendix E.
2 Related Literature and Contribution
Our paper contributes to several strands of literature, which we discuss in this section. The theoretical
literature on signaling intentions through cheap talk explores the potential for preplay communication
to select among multiple equilibria by breaking symmetries, offering assurance, and creating a focal
point for play (for a theoretical discussion, see Farrell, 1988; Farrell & Rabin, 1996; for experimental
evidence see Crawford, 1998; Charness, 2000). However, extensive experimental evidence shows that
communication can also lead players to coordinate on mutually beneficial but nonequilibrium outcomes
(Kerr & Kaufman-Gilliland, 1994; Sally, 1995; Ellingsen & Johannesson, 2004; Bicchieri & Lev-On, 2011).
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In particular, players often make and keep promises to cooperate in two-player partnership games where
the unique equilibrium involves no such cooperation (Charness & Dufwenberg, 2006; Vanberg, 2008;
Ederer & Stremitzer, 2017; Di Bartolomeo et al., 2018). We advance the theoretical analysis by presenting
a novel mechanism (intermediate reneging costs) by which preplay communication is able to sustain such
cooperative but apparently nonequilibrium action, and demonstrate its evolutionary stability.
Our analysis of direct psychological costs of going back on one’s word is related to the theoretical
literature incorporating exogenously given (and, typically, small) psychological lying costs into strategic
models. Kartik et al. (2007) and Kartik (2009) study sender-receiver games with convex lying costs and
Matsushima (2008) and Kartik et al. (2014) introduce arbitrarily small lying costs into settings of mech-
anism design and implementation. The present paper moves beyond the existing literature by analysing
bilateral communication about agents’ own future actions rather than unilateral communication about
an exogenously given state of the world. Additionally, we endogenise the reneging costs, and allow them
to be determined as part of a stable population state.1
We contribute to the literature on partnerships with strategic complementarities (pioneered by Holm-
strom, 1982) by introducing reneging costs. Radner et al. (1986) show the capacity for repeated interac-
tion to sustain effort in a partnership game when this is efficient but not an equilibrium of the one-shot
game (see also related models in Cooper & John, 1988; Admati & Perry, 1991; Cahuc & Kempf, 1997;
Marx & Matthews, 2000). We demonstrate that reneging costs is a new means by which cooperation
can be sustained in partnerships in one-off encounters with nonenforceable effort choices.
The theoretical model that we present rationalises the main stylised facts of the experimental litera-
ture on promising and lying. Intrinsic costs of lying or reneging on one’s promise have been examined in
a number of laboratory setups including: (1) trust games (Ellingsen & Johannesson, 2004; Charness &
Dufwenberg, 2006; Vanberg, 2008; Ederer & Stremitzer, 2017; Di Bartolomeo et al., 2018), (2) sender-
receiver games (Gneezy, 2005; Sánchez-Pagés & Vorsatz, 2007; Hurkens & Kartik, 2009; Lundquist et al.,
2009), and (3) reporting the outcome of a private dice roll (Fischbacher & Föllmi-Heusi, 2013; Shalvi
et al., 2011; Gneezy et al., 2018; Abeler et al., 2019). Experimental evidence suggests that subjects do
not always lie to gain money, even when their doing so cannot be detected.2 In experiments on promises,
subjects only sometimes renege on promises to carry out actions that are socially beneficial but reduce
their own payoff and, on average, achieve more efficient outcomes than when promises cannot be made
(Charness & Dufwenberg, 2006; Vanberg, 2008; Ederer & Stremitzer, 2017; Di Bartolomeo et al., 2018).
We defer further discussion of the relation between our model and the experimental evidence to
Section 7. We note here that the stylised facts from these experiments suggest that the intrinsic costs
of lying/reneging are intermediate, and are increasing (potentially convexly) with one or more of the
following : (I) the difference between the reported/exerted outcome and the true/promised outcome,
(II) the damage caused to the partner by the lying/reneging, and (III) others’ perceptions of the agent’s
1Demichelis & Weibull (2008) study the influence of the introduction of lexicographic reneging costs into a setup in
which players communicate before playing a coordination game. They show that the introduction of these reneging costs
implies that the unique evolutionarily stable outcome is Pareto efficient. Heller (2014) shows that this sharp equilibrium
selection result is implied by the discontinuity of preferences, rather than by small reneging costs per se.
2In the case of reporting a private dice roll, Abeler et al.’s Finding 1 demonstrates that subjects obtain only about a
quarter of the payoff they could obtain by reporting the die’s maximal outcome. When subjects lie, they sometimes do so
by using a nonmaximal lie (see, e.g., Abeler et al., Finding 5), suggesting that bigger lies induce higher intrinsic costs.
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behaviour (e.g., the agent derives disutility in proportion to the extent to which he is perceived to cheat;
see Dufwenberg & Dufwenberg, 2018). In our model the intrinsic cost of reneging is proportional to the
difference between the promised and exerted effort, which directly captures (I). In a richer model, in
which others observe effort with some random noise, this difference can also capture (III). In Section 6,
we describe a variant of our model in which an intrinsic cost of reneging is incurred only if the promised
effort is smaller than the exerted effort (formal analysis of this variant is in Appendix D). This captures
(II), as in this variant the partner suffers a utility loss proportional to the extent to which promised
effort was higher than exerted effort. Our model therefore captures the central findings of these studies,
but also allows the level of reneging aversion to be endogenously determined by an evolutionary process,
providing a theoretical foundation and explanation for the stylised experimental facts.
In our theoretical exploration of the potential evolutionary determinants of reneging aversion, we
build on the “indirect” evolutionary approach, pioneered by Güth & Yaari (1992), and developed by,
among others, Ok & Vega-Redondo (2001), Guttman (2003), Dekel et al. (2007), Herold & Kuzmics
(2009), Alger & Weibull (2010), and Alger & Weibull (2012). We make two main contributions to this
literature. First, to the best of our knowledge, we are the first to apply the indirect evolutionary approach
to study reneging costs.3 Second, our main result is qualitatively different from the stylised result in this
literature, according to which if preferences are observable, then the Pareto-efficient outcome is played
in any stable population state. We show that in the setup in which the set of feasible preferences is
the set of levels of reneging aversion, evolutionary forces take the population into stable states in which
agents have intermediate reneging aversion and the agents achieve partial, rather than full, efficiency.
Finally, the role of commitment in strategic situations has been extensively investigated since the
seminal work of Schelling (1980) (see, e.g., Caruana & Einav, 2008; Ellingsen & Miettinen, 2008; Heller
& Winter, 2016 for recent papers in this vast literature). One of the main stylised insights of this
literature is that the ability to commit is advantageous to a player and that, typically, a better ability
to commit yields higher payoffs. Our model yields the insight that too great a capacity for commitment
(i.e., too high a level of reneging aversion) might be detrimental. Specifically, we show that there is an
intermediate level of commitment that is optimal for an agent, as it balances his interest in making a
strong commitment in order to induce high effort from his partner, against his conflicting desire to retain
some flexibility to exert less effort.
3 The Partnership Game
In this section, we formally describe the partnership game and analyse the perfect equilibria of encounters
between any two players with weakly positive aversion to reneging on promises.
3Heifetz et al. (2007a,b) find that under payoff-monotonic evolution of preferences with perfect observability, any “dis-
tortion” of preferences (divergences between the subjective utility and the material payoffs) will be stable at some non-zero
level. Their setup imposes particular assumptions not satisfied by our model but we nevertheless show results that are
consistent with their findings and, in addition, explicitly characterise the unique stable level of reneging aversion.
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3.1 Model
There are two players (i and j) and two stages of the game. In the first stage, both players simultaneously
send a message sk ∈ [0, 1] to their opponent (where k = i, j). The interpretation is that players’ messages
take the form of a promise about effort in the second stage. In the second stage, players simultaneously
choose their level of effort, xk ∈ [0, 1].
Remark 1. For simplicity, we define the maximum message (and level of effort) to be one. All of our
results remain qualitatively the same, for any other upper limit M > 0 to the set of messages.
We focus on a specific family of quadratic payoff functions. We define the material payoff of a player
who exerts effort xi and whose partner exerts effort xj as the following function:
π(xi, xj , c) = xi · xj − c · x
2
i
2
: c ∈ (1, 2) . (1)
The interpretation of the material payoff is as follows. Both players receive the same gross return
from the partnership, equal to the product of their two effort choices. They each incur a cost proportional
to the square of their own effort. The parameter c ∈ (1, 2) governs the cost of effort.4
The subjective utility of each player i is defined as follows:
Ui(xi, xj , si, c) = xi · xj − c · x
2
i
2
− λi
2
(si − xi)2. (2)
Subjective utility is the sum of a player’s material payoff and a term representing the psychological
cost of breaking a promise (reneging). Reneging is defined as exerting a level of effort not equal to the
message sent (i.e., the effort promised) in the first stage. The “size” of player i’s reneging is defined
as |si − xi|. The utility loss from reneging is proportional to the square of its size, multiplied by λi, a
parameter that we call i’s level of reneging aversion. We assume that each player perfectly observes his
partner’s level of reneging aversion, i.e., the parameters λi, λj are common knowledge.
We extend the material payoffs and the subjective utility to mixed strategies in the usual linear way
(i.e., players are expected utility maximisers). It turns out that, essentially, all perfect equilibria are
pure; thus, we focus in the main text on pure strategies. (We formally deal with mixed strategies in
Lemma 1 and Footnote 15.)
3.2 Unique Second-Stage Equilibrium and First-Stage Best-Reply Functions
In the second stage of the game, player i’s first-order condition for his choice of xi is given by
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xj − cxi + λi(si − xi) = 0. (3)
4We restrict attention to c ∈ (1, 2) as this is the interval in which (1) players exerting maximal effort is efficient and (2),
as shown below, the game with simultaneous effort choices encourages shirking above an effort of zero. Note that when
c > 2, the efficient outcome is for both players to exert zero effort. When c < 1, the unique Nash equilibrium in the game
with simultaneous effort choices is xi = xj = 1.
5The second derivative of the utility function with respect to xi is −c−λi. The fact that it is always negative guarantees
that the solution to the first-order condition is a global maximum of the utility function and that the optimal choice in the
second stage is a unique pure strategy.
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The strict concavity of the utility function in xi implies that the second-stage best reply is a unique
pure strategy, which implies that we can focus in the second stage, without loss of generality, on pure
strategies. The unique best-reply strategy is given by the function
x∗i (xj , si, sj , λi, λj , c) =
xj + λisi
c+ λi
. (4)
This function is a weighted average of the level of effort which maximises the player’s material payoff (
xj
c
)
and that which fulfills his promise (si), with greater weight placed on si as reneging aversion increases.
This equation therefore embodies the way that a player trades-off undercutting (exerting less effort than)
his partner and coming closer to keeping his promise.
Fact 1. We first observe that when λi = λj = 0 (i.e., both players’ messages are cheap talk), the best
reply of player i reduces to
xj
c
. This implies that when talk is cheap, both players wish to undercut their
partner in the second stage, effort choices are independent of messages sent, and in all subgame-perfect
equilibria, neither player exerts effort and communication plays no committing role.
To consider the general case of positive reneging costs, we solve the best-reply functions simulta-
neously and obtain the unique Nash equilibrium strategy for player i in the subgame induced by an
arbitrary pair of messages si and sj :
xei (si, sj , λi, λj , c) =
(c+ λj)λisi + λjsj
(c+ λi)(c+ λj)− 1 . (5)
To gain some intuition, we can consider the subgame after si = sj = s is played. In this case, xi <
xj ⇐⇒ λi < λj . Both players have an incentive to undercut one another (and by implication renege
on their own first-stage promises), but at the same time they do not want to incur too great a cost from
reneging. Due to the convex cost of reneging and the diminishing material gains from reducing effort
toward
xj
c
, the optimal choice of xi balances these two aims. In the general case where si 6= sj , the Nash
equilibrium choice of xi is some convex combination of
6 si, sj , and 0. As a player’s level of reneging
aversion increases, he will exert effort closer to his own promise.
The subgame-perfect equilibrium of the game is easily obtained using backward induction. Given
the unique Nash equilibrium strategies in each subgame, we can derive the player’s utility Ui(si, sj , c)
as a function of the messages sent by the agent and his partner (assuming that both players follow the
unique Nash equilibrium in the second stage of the game).
Ui(si, sj , c) ≡ Ui
(
xei (si, sj , λi, λj , c), x
e
j(si, sj , λi, λj , c), si, c
)
. (6)
Clearly, if λi = 0, then a player’s choice of message has no impact upon his own or his partner’s choices
and any message is a best reply. When λi > 0, it turns out that the derived utility function Ui(si, sj , c)
leads to a unique pure best reply in all but a measure zero of cases,7 which implies that, without loss of
6To see this, observe that the denominator of the fraction is strictly positive and strictly greater than the sum of the
coefficients on si and s−i in the numerator.
7The choice of best reply in these measure-zero cases plays no role in our analysis.
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generality, we can focus on pure strategies (formal details for this argument are presented in the proof
of Proposition 1 in Appendix E.2).
Our first result characterises the first-stage best-reply functions. Let s∗i (sj |λi, λj , c) denote the best
reply of agent i (with reneging aversion λi) to a partner’s message of sj , where the cost of effort is
c. We show that there exists a threshold λ¯c ≡ 2−c2c−1 , such that an agent overcuts his partner (i.e.,
s∗i (sj |λi, λj , c) > sj for each sj ∈ (0, 1)) if and only if the partner’s reneging aversion is below this
threshold and the agent’s reneging aversion is sufficiently high. Formally:
Proposition 1. There exists a function g : R+ × [1, 2]→ R+, such that:
1. Overcutting: s∗i (sj |λi, λj , c) > sj if λj < 2−c
2
c−1 , λi > g (λj , c) and sj ∈ (0, 1).
2. Undercutting: s∗i (sj |λi, λj , c) < sj if sj > 0 and
(
λj ≥ 2−c2c−1 or λi ∈ (0, g (λj , c))
)
.
Observe that c ≥ √2 implies 2−c2
c−1 ≤ 0 and that each agent will undercut his partner’s message. The
division of the parameter space into these best-reply types (undercutting vs. overcutting) is illustrated
in Figure 1 for the effort costs of c = 1.1 and c = 1.2.
3.3 Unique Perfect Equilibrium
We now characterise the subgame-perfect equilibria of the partnership game. Recall that a strategy
profile
(
s∗i , s
∗
j , x
∗
i , x
∗
j
)
(where s∗i , s
∗
j ∈ [0, 1] are the first-stage promises and the functions x∗i , x∗j : [0, 1]2 →
[0, 1] describe the second-stage efforts as a function of the observed promises) is a subgame-perfect
equilibrium if for each player i (1) x∗i (
−→s ) ≡ x∗i (si, sj) = xei (si, sj , λi, λj , c) (i.e., best replying in the
second stage), and (2) Ui(s
∗
i , s
∗
j , c) ≥ Ui(s′i, s∗j , c) for each message s′i ∈ [0, 1] (i.e., best replying in the
first stage), where the derived utility Ui(s
∗
i , s
∗
j , c) is as defined in (6).
We show that all subgame-perfect equilibria can be classified into three types:
1. Maximum-message equilibrium, in which agents send maximal promises, i.e., s∗i = s
∗
j = 1.
2. No-effort equilibrium, in which agents exert no effort, i.e., x∗i
(−→
s∗
)
= x∗j
(−→
s∗
)
= 0. In this equilib-
rium any agent with a positive reneging aversion promises nothing, i.e., λi > 0⇒ s∗i = 0.
3. Two-message equilibrium, in which the agent with higher reneging aversion sends the maximal
message, while his partner undercuts the agent’s message, i.e., either si = 1 > sj or sj = 1 > si.
In some parameterisations of the game, the subgame-perfect equilibrium is unique. In all the remaining
cases (except the “measure zero” set of pairs with multiple equilibria discussed below), the game admits
two subgame-perfect equilibria, where only one of these equilibria satisfies trembling-hand perfection
(see the formal definition, a` la Selten, 1975; Simon & Stinchcombe, 1995, in Appendix A). The imperfect
equilibrium is characterised by each agent sending a zero message. However, any small perturbation
(e.g., with a small probability, ǫ, each player trembles and sends a positive message) induces at least one
of the agents to overcut his partner, and this equilibrium is eliminated from the perturbed game.
Theorem 1, below, shows that:
8
(a) c = 1.1 (b) c = 1.2
Figure 1: Best-Reply Types for Player i in a Reneging Aversion Parameter Space. The
x axis in each figure presents the player’s level of reneging aversion (λi) and the y axis presents the
partner’s level of reneging aversion (λj). The left panel deals with a cost of effort of c = 1.1 and the
right figure deals with c = 1.2. The dark area in each panel is the region in which player i’s best reply
is to undercut his partner, i.e., s∗i (sj) < sj ; the light area in each panel is the region in which player
i’s best reply is to overcut his partner, i.e., s∗i (sj) > sj . The dashed line in each figure shows the
value λj = λ¯c ≡ 2−c2c−1 > 0 presented in Proposition 1, above which player i’s best reply is to undercut
his partner regardless of the value of λi.
1. There is a convex symmetric region of intermediate levels of reneging aversion, Λcmax, in which
the game admits only a maximum-message equilibrium. This region is nonempty if and only if
c < 1.25 and, in this case, there is a symmetric point
(
λ+c , λ
+
c
)
in the boundary of this region,
which is higher than any point in the region.
2. There are two disjoint areas in which one agent has a sufficiently low level of reneging aversion
and his partner has a sufficiently high level of reneging aversion, and the game admits only a
two-message equilibrium. This region, Λc2ms, is nonempty if and only if c <
√
2.
3. In the remaining region, Λc0ef , the partnership game admits only a no-effort equilibrium. This
region includes two areas: (1) an area in which both agents have sufficiently high levels of reneging
aversion and (2) an area in which both agents have sufficiently low levels of reneging aversion.
Figure 2 illustrates the division of the reneging aversion parameter space into the three classes of unique
perfect equilibria for the effort costs of c = 1.1 and c = 1.2.
9
(a) c = 1.1 (b) c = 1.2
Figure 2: Unique Perfect Equilibrium Types in a Reneging Aversion Parameter Space.
The x axis in each figure presents the player’s level of reneging aversion (λi) and the y axis presents
the partner’s level of reneging aversion (λj). The left panel deals with a cost of effort of c = 1.1 and
the right panel deals with c = 1.2. The dark areas in each figure are the regions in which both agents
exert no effort in equilibrium (“No Effort”). The light area in each figure is the region in which
both agents promise maximal efforts in the unique perfect equilibrium (“Maximum Message”). The
remaining areas are the regions in which one of the agents sends a maximal promise (“2 Message”).
Let PE (λi, λj , c) denote the set of all trembling-hand perfect equilibria (as defined Appendix A) in
of the partnership game with levels of reneging aversion λi and λj and effort cost c. Let Cl (Λ) denote
closure of the set Λ, i.e., the set Λ together with all its limit points. A formal statement of our result is
as follows.
Theorem 1. For each c > 1, there exist disjoint symmetric sets Λc0ef ,Λ
c
max,Λ
c
2ms ⊆ [0,∞)2 with an
exhaustive union of closures (i.e., Cl
(
Λc0ef
)
∪Cl (Λcmax)∪Cl (Λc2ms) = [0,∞)2) that satisfy the following
properties:
1. Region of maximum-message equilibrium Λcmax:
(a) If (λi, λj) ∈ Λcmax then there is a unique
(
s∗i , s
∗
j , x
∗
i , x
∗
j
)
∈ PE (λi, λj , c), and s∗i = s∗j = 1.
(b) Λcmax is a convex set, which is nonempty iff c ∈ (1, 1.25).
(c) For each c < 1.25, there exists
(
λ+c , λ
+
c
) ∈ Cl (Λcmax) such that (λi, λj) ∈ Λcmax ⇒ λi, λj < λ+c .
2. Region of two-message equilibrium Λc2ms:
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(a) If (λi, λj) ∈ Λc2ms and λj < λi then there is a unique perfect equilibrium
(
s∗i , s
∗
j , x
∗
i , x
∗
j
)
∈
PE (λi, λj , c), and s
∗
j < s
∗
i = 1.
(b) Λc2ms is nonempty iff c ∈
(
1,
√
2
)
.
(c) If 0 < λj <
2
c
− c and λi is sufficiently high, then (λi, λj) ∈ Λc2ms.
3. Region of no-effort equilibrium Λc0ef :
(a) If (λi, λj) ∈ Λc0ef then there is a unique perfect equilibrium
(
s∗i , s
∗
j , x
∗
i , x
∗
j
)
∈ PE (λi, λj , c),
and x∗i (
−→s ∗) = x∗j (−→s ∗) = s∗i = s∗j = 0.
(b) There exist 0 < λc < λc such that (λi, λj) ∈ Λc0ef if either 0 < λi, λj < λc or λi, λj > λc.
The intuition for these results is as follows. When both λi and λj are low or when both are high,
the unique equilibrium is a no-effort equilibrium. Too low reneging costs induce too little commitment
power and, as a result, each agent undercuts his partner’s effort in the second round regardless of the
promises. Too high reneging costs leave too little flexibility for the second round, which induces each
agent to undercut his partner’s promise in the first round.
When one player has a high level of reneging aversion and the other a low level and c ∈
(
1,
√
2
)
,
the unique equilibrium is a two-message equilibrium. The intuition is that only the agent with the
high reneging cost has a substantial commitment power, while their partner’s promise has a very small
impact on either player’s effort choice. As a result, the agent with the high reneging cost is essentially
a Stackelberg leader (he essentially chooses his effort by the committing promise he makes in the first
round), while the partner is essentially a Stackelberg follower (her promise in the first round has little
influence on her choice of effort in the second round). The lower the cost of effort is, the higher the
effort that the Stackelberg follower will exert in reply to a given promise by the leader. When the effort
cost is low enough, it therefore becomes worthwhile for the leader to make the promise of high effort.
Similarly to a standard setup of duopoly with strategic complements, the Stackelberg follower has the
higher payoff.
Finally if both players’ levels of reneging aversion are intermediate (and sufficiently similar) and
c ∈ (1, 1.25), then we have the maximum-message equilibrium. If the partner’s level of reneging aversion
is not too high, the indirect benefit of overcutting the partner’s message (i.e. the greater material payoff
that is achieved because promising more effort induces the partner to exert more effort in the second
stage) is increasing in the agent’s level of reneging aversion, as higher reneging aversion makes his promise
more credible. If the agent’s level of reneging aversion is sufficiently high, this benefit outweighs the
direct cost of restricting his ability to shirk in the second stage. Therefore, if both players have a level of
reneging aversion that is high enough to give them committing power but is not so high that they do not
have some flexibility in the second stage, they will wish to overcut each other. This happens in a convex
region of intermediate levels of reneging aversion. In this region, both players are sufficiently bound by
their message to be able to strategically induce high effort in their partner, but are also flexible enough
to respond to their partner’s promise.
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4 Appealing Properties of Intermediate Reneging Aversion, λ+c
Induced population game Theorem 1 has shown that almost all partnership games have a unique
trembling-hand perfect equilibrium. Multiple perfect equilibria may occur only on a “measure-zero” of
pairs of λi, λj that are located on the boundaries between the open sets Λ
c
0ef , Λ
c
max, and Λ
c
2ms. In the
remaining “measure-one” set of pairs of levels of reneging aversion, we define πc (λi, λj) to be the unique
trembling-hand perfect equilibrium payoff of an agent with reneging aversion λi who is matched with a
partner with reneging aversion λj .
Recall, that, for each c ∈ (1, 1.25), one of the pairs in these measure-zero boundaries is (λ+c , λ+c ),
which is the upper limit of all pairs in the set Λcmax of intermediate levels of reneging aversion that
induce maximal messages. In Corollary 2 of Theorem 1 (Appendix E.5), we show that the pair of levels
of reneging aversion
(
λ+c , λ
+
c
)
induces a continuum of perfect equilibria. Specifically, for each message
s∗ ∈ [0, 1], there is a trembling-hand perfect equilibrium in which both agents send message s∗. We
define πc
(
λ+c , λ
+
c
)
as the highest equilibrium payoff among these equilibria (i.e., the payoff induced in
the equilibrium in which the agents send the maximal message, s∗ = 1). We discuss this equilibrium
selection in Remark 2 below. Given any other pair (λi, λj) with multiple equilibria, we can apply any
arbitrary equilibrium selection function (without affecting our results), and we let πc (λi, λj) (Uc (λi, λj))
be the material (subjective) payoff induced by the arbitrarily selected equilibrium.
The payoff function πc : R
+ × R+ → R+ defined above induces a symmetric two-player population
game Γ =
(
R
+, πc
)
. This population game can be interpreted as being played between two principals,
where each principal simultaneously chooses a reneging cost for his agent, the two agents are matched
to play the partnership game (where each agent observes his partner’s reneging cost), and they play
the trembling-hand perfect equilibrium of the partnership game (applying the equilibrium selection
function mentioned above when multiple perfect equilibria exist). In Section 5 we discuss an evolutionary
interpretation of the population game and of our results.
A pure (mixed) strategy in this game corresponds to a level of reneging aversion (a distribution over
levels of reneging aversion). We say that (λ, λ) is a symmetric (strict) pure Nash equilibrium of the
population game if πc (λ, λ) ≥ πc (λ′, λ) (πc (λ, λ) > πc (λ′, λ)) for each λ′ 6= λ.
Appealing properties of λ+c In the following result we focus on the case of low costs of effort,
in which maximum-message equilibria exist (i.e., we focus on the case of c < 1.25). We show that the
maximum-message equilibrium induced by the symmetric pair of intermediate levels of reneging aversion(
λ+c , λ
+
c
)
has various appealing properties:
1. “Second-best” symmetric outcome: The trembling-hand perfect equilibrium induced by
(
λ+c , λ
+
c
)
yields the best equilibrium outcome among all trembling-hand perfect equilibrium outcomes of
symmetric partnership games. This holds both for the material payoff, as well as for the subjective
payoff, i.e., πc
(
λ+c , λ
+
c
)
> πc
(
λ
′
, λ′
)
and Uc
(
λ+c , λ
+
c
)
> Uc
(
λ
′
, λ′
)
for any λ′ 6= λ+c .
2. As c converges to 1, the equilibrium material payoff and equilibrium subjective payoff both converge
to the maximum feasible payoff, achieved by both agents promising and exerting the maximum
effort of one. This maximal payoff is equal to 1− c2 , and it converges to 0.5 as c converges to 1.
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3. It is a strict equilibrium of the population game (i.e., (πc
(
λ+c , λ
+
c
)
> πc
(
λ′, λ+c
)
).
4. The equilibrium material payoff πc
(
λ+c , λ
+
c
)
is larger than the average of the two players’ payoffs
induced in a “Stackelberg” equilibrium without reneging costs (i.e., the equilibrium when effort
levels are chosen sequentially), if the cost of effort is low (c < 1.22).
5. The population game does not admit any other symmetric pure equilibrium.
Theorem 2. Fix c ∈ (1, 1.25). Let (λ+c , λ+c ) be the highest symmetric pair of levels of reneging aversion
inducing a maximum-message equilibrium. The equilibrium induced by
(
λ+c , λ
+
c
)
satisfy:
1. “Second-best” symmetric outcome: πc
(
λ+c , λ
+
c
)
> πc
(
λ
′
, λ′
)
and Uc
(
λ+c , λ
+
c
)
> Uc
(
λ
′
, λ′
)
for any
λ′ 6= λ+c .
2. Convergence to “first-best” outcome: limc→1 πc
(
λ+c , λ
+
c
)
= limc→1 Uc
(
λ+c , λ
+
c
)
= 12 (which is the
best symmetric feasible payoff).
3. Strict equilibrium of the population game: πc
(
λ+c , λ
+
c
)
> πc
(
λ′, λ+c
)
for each λ′ 6= λ+c .
4. Better outcome than the sequential-game equilibrium outcome when effort costs are low: Let πsi be
the payoff to player i in the unique equilibrium of the game where efforts are chosen sequentially
(and there are no reneging costs). Then if c < 1.22, πc
(
λ+c , λ
+
c
)
> 12 ·
(
πsi + π
s
j
)
.
5. Unique pure symmetric equilibrium: If c < 1.24 and there is λ∗ such that πc (λ∗, λ∗) ≥ πc (λ′, λ∗)
for each λ′, then8 λ∗ = λ+c .
Sketch of proof.
1. “Second-best” symmetric outcome: Theorem 2 implies that any higher symmetric level of reneging
aversion λ > λ+c induces the no-effort equilibrium with zero payoffs. We show that the weaker
commitment power induced by lower symmetric levels of reneging aversion λ < λ+c induces agents
to exert less effort relative to the equilibrium induced by λ+c , and thus to achieve a lower material
payoff. Higher levels of reneging aversion have both a positive “direct” effect of increasing players’
chosen levels of efforts (due to the the desire to avoid the reneging cost) and an “indirect” strategic
effect as the players each anticipate the higher effort that will be exerted by the other. These
positive impacts on effort levels are great enough to outweigh the increased psychological cost of
reneging, such that λ+c also induces the “second-best” level of subjective utility.
2. Convergence to “first-best” outcome: Players material payoffs are maximised if they exert 1
c
times
their partner’s effort. As c converges to one, this converges to the partner’s effort choice and so the
incentives to shirk are diminished, and, as a result, the equilibrium effort levels converge to one.
3. Strict equilibrium of the population game: For any λ > λ+c the game induced by
(
λ, λ+c
)
admits
only the no-effort equilibrium with zero payoffs. When λ < λ+c , the lower commitment power of
8Our proof technique allows us to prove the uniqueness results only for c ∈ (1, 1.24). Numeric simulations suggest that
the result also holds for c ∈ (1.24, 1.25).
13
the λ-player implies that the players exert less effort in equilibrium, and the payoff of both players
is lower than the equilibrium payoff of the game induced by
(
λ+c , λ
+
c
)
.
4. Better outcome than the sequential-game equilibrium outcome: In the sequential effort setting (with
no reneging costs) the “Stackelberg leader” will choose effort level 1 and the follower will choose
effort level 1
c
. In the equilibrium outcome under λ+c , both agents promise to exert an effort of 1,
and in the second stage due to the substantial reneging costs, the agents choose an effort that is
much closer to one than to 1
c
, when the cost of effort is sufficiently low.9 The intuition for why the
average payoff with reneging costs converges “faster” to the first best as effort costs decrease (as
compared to sequential effort choices) is that, whereas with sequential choices lower effort costs
mean simply that the second player has a smaller incentive to shirk, and so puts in more effort
as effort costs fall (with no change in the leader’s action), with communication there is a positive
reinforcing mechanism whereby the knowledge that his partner is going to put in more effort means
that a player will put in more effort himself, leading his partner to exert more effort, and so on.
5. Unique pure symmetric equilibrium: We show that an agent can gain by having a higher reneging
cost than his partner for every level of the partner’s reneging aversion λ < λ+c , which implies
that (λ, λ) is not a Nash equilibrium of the population game for any λ < λ+c . The intuition is
that the indirect gain induced by the stronger commitment power of the agent (which induces the
partner to exert more effort) outweighs the loss induced by the smaller flexibility in the second
stage. Observe that Theorem 1 implies that for any λ > λ+c the game induced by (λ, λ) admits
the no-effort equilibrium, which yields zero payoffs. One can show that if an agent deviates to a
sufficiently low level of reneging aversion, then the players play a two-message equilibrium that
yields the deviator a positive payoff. Thus (λ, λ) is not a Nash equilibrium for any λ > λ+c .
5 Evolutionary Interpretation of Our Results
Consider a large population of players (technically, a continuum) in which each player is endowed with
a level of reneging aversion. Players are uniformly randomly matched into pairs, and both observe their
partner’s level of reneging aversion before starting the two-stage partnership game described above. We
assume that in each partnership game, the players play the unique perfect equilibrium (and they follow
the equilibrium selection function described above when there are multiple equilibria).
Consider first the case in which the set of feasible levels of reneging aversion are discrete (e.g., the
set of feasible λs are 0, 0.01, 0.02, 0.03, ...). This discreteness might be due to having a finite, albeit very
large, set of feasible genotypes in biological evolutionary processes, or due to some constraints in social
evolutionary processes (e.g., each agent follows a simple rule of thumb to guide his behaviour, and the
set of simple rules is finite). It is well known that stable population states in this setup correspond to
symmetric equilibria of the population game, given a smooth and payoff-monotone dynamic process by
which the levels of reneging aversion in the population evolve, such as the replicator dynamics (Taylor
& Jonker, 1978; see Weibull, 1995; Sandholm, 2010 for a textbook introduction). Specifically:
9The higher payoff in the equilibrium induced by
(
λ+c , λ
+
c
)
holds for any c < 1.22, but it does not hold for c ∈ (1.22, 1.25).
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1. Any symmetric strict equilibrium corresponds to a stable population state in which all agents have
the same level of reneging aversion. Any agent who is endowed with a different level of reneging
aversion (due to random error or experimentation) is strictly outperformed and is assumed to be
eliminated from the population. The same holds for any sufficiently small group of “mutant” agents
who are endowed with a different level of reneging aversion. In particular, it is well known that
any strict equilibrium is an evolutionarily stable state a` la Maynard Smith & Price (1973).
2. Any stable population state must be a symmetric Nash equilibrium (see, e.g., Nachbar, 1990).
Otherwise, there is a level of reneging aversion that allows a deviator to strictly outperform the
incumbents; we assume that other agents will start to mimic such a successful deviator, and that
the population will move away from the initial state.
Thus, part (3) of Theorem 2 (which states that
(
λ+c , λ
+
c
)
is a strict equilibrium of the population game)
implies that the homogeneous population state in which all agents have the same intermediate level of
reneging aversion λ+c is dynamically stable. Part (5) of Theorem 2 (which states that the population game
does not admit any other symmetric pure equilibrium) implies that this state is the unique homogeneous
stable state. This suggests a tendency of evolutionary processes to select the level of reneging aversion
λ+c when players each observe their partner’s type.
When the set of feasible levels of reneging aversion is a continuum (i.e., without the discretization
described above), then, as argued by Eshel (1983) and Oechssler & Riedel (2002), a strict equilibrium
might not be a sufficient condition for dynamic stability in setups in which a small perturbation can
slightly change the reneging aversion of all agents in the population. In Appendix B we discuss the
relevant notions of continuous stability proposed by these authors, and briefly sketch how our equilibrium
can satisfy a somewhat weaker version of these these refinements.
Remark 2 (Alternative equilibrium selection). Theorem 2 depends on the equilibrium selection function
choosing the most efficient equilibrium in the game in which both agents have reneging aversion λ+c . In
what follows, we discuss two informal arguments that could justify such an assumption.
1. Discrete set of feasible levels of reneging aversion: Consider the setup in which the set of
feasible levels of reneging aversion are discrete (as described above). Suppose that none of these
discrete levels of reneging aversion is λ+c . Let λ
∗ = λ+c − ε be the largest level of reneging aversion
such that (λ∗, λ∗) induces a maximum message equilibrium in the partnership game. By Theorem
1, this equilibrium is unique. Further, as payoffs and utilities are continuous in reneging aversion
within each of the three regions of the parameter space, (λ∗, λ∗) will be an equilibrium of the
population game, given ε is sufficiently small. Though we do not provide a formal analysis, it is
intuitive that results analogous to Theorem 2, with λ∗ in place of λ+c , should therefore hold in the
discrete case without requiring the equilibrium selection function assumption.
2. Focality of the efficient equilibrium: We do not formalise the dynamic process leading a popu-
lation to the homogeneous state in which everyone has the level of reneging aversion λ+c . Intuitively,
one plausible way in which the population can converge to λ+c is as follows. The populations begins
in a state in which agents have a lower intermediate level of reneging aversion λ < λ+c , and they
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play the unique perfect equilibrium induced by the state λ in which the messages are maximal. As
argued in the proof of part (4), the state λ is vulnerable to a few agents (“mutants”) experiment-
ing with a higher level of reneging aversion λ′ ∈ (λ, λ+c ), where the mutants also play the unique
perfect equilibrium (with maximal messages) against the incumbents. Such a sequence of invasions
of mutants will take the population to the state in which all agents have a reneging aversion of λ+c ,
and along this sequence the agents play the unique perfect equilibrium (with maximal messages).
Arguably, it is plausible that after the population converges to every agent having reneging aversion
λ+c (and multiple equilibria exist) the agents will continue to play the “focal” equilibrium, which is
similar to the unique maximum-message equilibrium played against the previous incumbents with
λ < λ+c .
Remark 3 (Delegation interpretation of our results). One can also apply our result to a setup of strategic
delegation. The literature on strategic delegation (see, e.g., Fershtman et al. 1991; Dufwenberg & Güth
1999; Fershtman & Gneezy 2001) deals with players who strategically use other agents to play on
their behalf, where the agents so used may have different preferences than the players using them.
One can interpret our setup as an environment in which the principals can choose agents to play the
partnership games on their behalf. The principals receive the material payoff from the partnership game
(i.e. principals have no reneging aversion) and they can choose to delegate to one of a number of agents,
who have different levels of reneging aversion and whose payoff is the corresponding subjective utility.
The results of this section show the strong tendency of principals in this setup to choose agents with the
intermediate level of reneging aversion λ+c .
6 Variants and Extensions
Our main model makes the following assumptions: (1) agents send their promises simultaneously, (2) an
agent incurs a reneging cost when his effort is higher than his promise (as well as when it is lower), (3)
the reneging costs of the agent are continuous around zero reneging, and (4) the utility function has a
specific quadratic form. In this section we describe how our main results are robust to relaxation each of
these assumptions. Formal statement of the results, and their proofs, are confined to Appendix D and
Appendix E, respectively.
We examine a variant of the partnership game in which there is sequential, rather than simultaneous,
making of promises. In stage 0 of the game, nature chooses at random which player (denoted by i) will
be the first to communicate (where each player has a probability of 50% of being the first). In stage 1,
player i sends a message si ∈ [0, 1] to player j and player j observes this. In stage 2, player j chooses a
message sj ∈ [0, 1] to send to player i and player i observes this. In stage 3, the players simultaneously
choose effort levels xi, xj ∈ [0, 1]. Utility levels and material payoffs are the same functions of messages
and effort levels as in the baseline model with simultaneous communication.
We show (Proposition 2) that the equilibrium induced by the partnership game with sequential
communication in which both players have reneging aversion λ+c induces a unique perfect equilibrium
that satisfies the same appealing properties as in the baseline model.10 The reason for this is that
10We do not determine whether the population game with sequential communication admits additional symmetric pure
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the combinations of levels of reneging aversion that induce maximum-message equilibria or two-message
equilibria in the game with simultaneous communication induce equilibria with the same promises, effort
levels and payoffs under sequential communication.
Next, we consider “one-sided” reneging costs where an agent incurs a cost of reneging only if their
effort is less than was promised. The subjective utility function of each player i is redefined as follows:
Ui(xi, xj , si, c) = xi · xj − c · x
2
i
2
− 1si>xi
λi
2
(si − xi)2. (7)
This “one-sided” cost can be seen as representing “guilt” that is proportional to the damage caused to
the partner due to the fact that the agent broke his promise (see, e.g., Charness & Dufwenberg, 2006).
When the agent exerts more effort than promised, there is no damage to the partner, and thus no guilt.
When the agent i’s exerted effort is less than his promise, then the loss to the partner is xj · (si − xi) ,
which is proportional to the difference between i’s promised and exerted effort. We show (Prop. 3) that(
λ+c , λ
+
c
)
is a strict Nash equilibrium of the population game with one-sided reneging costs, it induces
the second-best symmetric outcome, it converges to the first-best outcome in the limit when c converges
to one, and it induces a better outcome than the sequential-game equilibrium without reneging costs.
Next, we examine a variant of the model in which an agent incurs a fixed reneging cost whenever
the exerted effort is different from the promised effort, regardless of the size of the difference. That is,
agents care about perfectly keeping their promises. Any reneging on a promise, regardless of the size of
the reneging, incurs the same intrinsic cost to the agent. For each βi, βj ≥ 0 we define the partnership
game with fixed reneging costs βi, βj in the same way as the baseline model except that we change the
reneging cost term such that the subjective utility function of each player i is redefined as follows:
Ui(xi, xj , si, c) = xi · xj − c · x
2
i
2
− βi · 1si 6=xi . (8)
We interpret βi ≥ 0 as the fixed reneging aversion of player i (i.e., the intrinsic cost he incurs by reneging
on a promise, regardless of the extent of the reneging). We show (Proposition 4) that there exists an
intermediate level of fixed reneging aversion, β+c , that induces the players to promise and exert maximal
effort as part of a trembling-hand perfect equilibrium. This equilibrium induces the first-best outcome.11
Finally, we consider more general forms of the utility function. We analyse a general class of games
with strategic complements and show that if both agents have either too low or too high reneging costs
then essentially no effort is exerted by either player in the game. Effort can only be exerted when
reneging costs are intermediate. This demonstrates that the intuition of our baseline model carries over
to a more general setup. We formally define this game and formally set out this result in Appendix D.
equilibria and leave this question for future research.
11It is difficult to adapt the evolutionary analysis of the baseline model to this setup, because the partnership game with
fixed reneging costs may admit multiple trembling-hand perfect equilibria, which makes it difficult to define the payoffs in
the induced population game, and to study evolutionary stability of population states.
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7 Conclusion
We have demonstrated that an intermediate level of reneging aversion is evolutionarily stable and has a
number of appealing properties: it induces a second-best outcome, which converges to the first-best in
the limit of small costs of exerting efforts, and it induces a socially better outcome than the Stackelberg-
leader setup. Moreover, our main results are robust to relaxations of the model’s assumptions to allow
for sequential communication, one-sided reneging costs, reneging costs that are discontinuous around
zero, and non-quadratic utility.
These results demonstrate a strong tendency of evolution to select preferences for the partial keeping
of promises. In stable populations, players make slightly “overoptimistic” promises and, while these
are not fully realised, the outcome is welfare-maximising among symmetric equilibria of the game. This
stands in sharp contrast to the cheap talk prediction of no effort ever being exerted in these partnerships.
We have here developed the first evolutionary analysis of a direct concern for keeping one’s word.
In doing so, we give an evolutionary explanation of several key observations in the related empirical
literature. In our model, a population of players with the stable level of reneging aversion will exert no
effort if they cannot communicate before choosing their actions, but the opportunity to send messages
will lead to promises being made and higher levels of effort being exerted. This replicates the finding of
several experimental studies (Charness & Dufwenberg 2006; Vanberg 2008; Ederer & Stremitzer 2017;
Di Bartolomeo et al. 2018) that players are significantly more likely to make “cooperative” choices in a
partnership setting when they can communicate before playing, and that players making promises are
particularly likely to cooperate.12 Secondly, in the presence of communication, the degree of cooperation
in our model is both incomplete (some reneging always takes place) and sensitive to the returns from
the partnership. The four aforementioned studies all find that: (1) not all pairs make choices that
achieve the cooperative outcome and (2) most players keep promises to play the cooperative or efficient
action but some players break their promise. Additionally, Charness & Dufwenberg (2006), who vary
the value of the outside option from not engaging in the partnership, find that players are less likely to
promise and achieve cooperation when the return from not cooperating is high. The setup in Ederer
& Stremitzer (2017) allows agents to choose to “perform” a promised action to varying degrees (where
higher performance reduces their own payoff but increases the social payoff) and they find substantial
amounts of partial reneging, consistent with our modeling of convex reneging costs.
There is in the experimental literature a debate over whether individuals are inclined to keep their
promises because they have an aversion to breaking their promises per se or because they are averse to
letting down others’ payoff expectations (so-called guilt aversion).13 We lay the theoretical foundations
for both of these accounts of promise-keeping. In our baseline model, the reneging costs can be interpreted
as a cost of promise-breaking per se. In the one-sided cost variant, individuals suffer a cost of reneging
12The appendix of Charness & Dufwenberg (2006) provides the text of the messages sent by players and demonstrates
that they were indeed often used to make explicit promises about their own future action. Ederer & Stremitzer (2017) and
Di Bartolomeo et al. (2018) classify communication according to whether or not it constituted a promise and show that
promises are associated with higher total payoffs relative to general forms of communication.
13Ederer & Stremitzer (2017) and Di Bartolomeo et al. (2018) further distinguish between agents who care about letting
down others’ payoff expectations in general (guilt aversion) and agents who care about letting down others’ expectations
when their promise has caused those expectations to be raised (conditional guilt aversion). In our model, these notions
coincide as payoffs are a function solely of players’ actions.
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only if they exert less effort than promised, and hence cause their partner to have a lower payoff than
if they did not renege, and the cost they experience is proportional to the impact on their partner’s
payoff, such that it can be interpreted as guilt aversion. In both cases, we demonstrate the evolutionary
stability and efficiency of intermediate levels of reneging aversion.
Finally, experiments on promises find heterogeneity in preferences for promise-keeping within the
populations studied. Additionally, Cohn et al. (2019) find heterogeneity in preferences for honesty
between populations in different countries. In our model, the stable level of reneging aversion is a
function of the parameters of the game played. If different populations have faced different environments
(i.e. different games) and evolution takes place within populations (for example if cultural exchange
and imitation mainly takes place between those in the same country) then our model could rationalise
heterogeneity in preferences between populations. While our evolutionary results pertain to homogenous
populations, the existence of two-message equilibria in partnership games with heterogeneous levels of
reneging aversion suggests that the evolution of heterogeneous preferences within populations could be
a fruitful subject for future research.
This research lends support to the focus of experimental and theoretical research on direct costs of
lying or reneging on one’s word in communication settings. Future research could explore the robustness
of the stability of intermediate reneging aversion in alternative types of games and with more general
information structures and when allowing for the evolution of the form of the reneging cost function,
not only the reneging aversion parameter. Finally, following Alger & Weibull (2013), we conjecture that
evolution under positive assortative matching could support the stability of non-cheap talk preferences
even when preferences are unobserved.
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Appendices (for Online Publication)
A Trembling-Hand Perfection
In this section we formally define the refinement of trembling-hand perfection. This refinement requires
that the equilibrium behaviour should be a limit of equilibria of perturbed environments in which the
players occasionally make mistakes (“tremble”).
As discussed in Section 3.2 the second stage of the game (in which players exert efforts, given the
realised promises) admits a unique Nash equilibrium. Thus, we can simplify the notation of our definition
of trembling-hand perfection by focusing only on trembles in the first stage, and assuming that players
always follow the unique Nash equilibrium of the second stage. Specifically, we study a one-shot game
(the promise game), in which agents simultaneously choose promises si, sj ∈ [0, 1]2 , and the utility
of the players Ui (si, sj , c) is determined by assuming that in the second stage the players must follow
the unique second-stage Nash equilibrium (as defined in Eq. (6)). Originally, Selten (1975) defined the
notion of trembling-hand perfection only for finite games. Because the set of promises in our setup is a
continuum, we follow Simon & Stinchcombe’s (1995) adaptation of trembling-hand perfection to infinite
games (called strong perfect equilibrium in Simon & Stinchcombe, Definition 1.2).
Fix c ∈ (1, 2). Let ∆fs ([0, 1]) be the set of (Borel) probability measures on [0, 1] assigning strictly
positive mass to every nonempty open subset of [0, 1]. Given a strategy σj ∈ ∆fs ([0, 1]), let BRci (σ−i)
be the set of distributions over promises (mixed promises) that are best replies to σ−i (where the players
are assumed to follow the unique Nash equilibrium when choosing their effort levels in the second-stage):
BRci (σj) =
{
argmaxσi∈[0,1]
(
Ui (σi, σ−i, c) ≡
∫
[0,1]2
(σi (si) · σj (sj) · Ui (si, s−i, c)) dsidsj
)}
.
An ǫ-perfect equilibrium is a full-support strategy profile in which each player assigns a probability
of at least 1− ǫ to best replies to the opponent’s strategy. Formally:
Definition 1. An ǫ-perfect equilibrium is a pair (σǫ1, σ
ǫ
2) ∈
(
∆fs ([0, 1])
)2
such that for each i ∈ {1, 2},
inf
σ˜i∈BRci(σǫj)
sup (|σǫi (B)− σ˜i (B) |B measurable|) < ǫ.
A perfect equilibrium is a limit of ǫ-perfect equilibria as ǫ converges to zero. Formally:
Definition 2. A pair of mixed promises (σ∗1, σ
∗
2) ∈ (∆ ([0, 1]))2 is a trembling-hand perfect equilibrium
if it is the weak limit as ǫn → 0 of a sequence of ǫn-perfect equilibria.
Simon & Stinchcombe (1995, Thm. 2.1) show that the set of perfect equilibria is a closed, nonempty
subset of the set of Nash equilibria of the promise game. Our definition of the promise game implies
that any Nash equilibrium
(
s∗i , s
∗
j
)
of the promise game (and, thus, any trembling-hand perfect equi-
librium of the promise game) induces a subgame-perfect equilibrium of the two-stage partnership game(
s∗i , s
∗
j , x
e
i , x
e
j
)
, where
(
xei (si, sj) , x
e
j (si, sj)
)
describes the unique second-stage Nash equilibrium in any
subgame. The arguments presented in the proof of Lemma 1 below imply that all Nash equilibria (and
hence all perfect equilibria) of the promise game are pure strategy profiles.
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Finally, we say that a subgame-perfect equilibrium
(
s∗i , s
∗
j , x
∗
i , x
∗
j
)
of the partnership game is trembling-
hand perfect if the pair of promises
(
s∗i , s
∗
j
)
is a trembling-hand perfect equilibrium of the induced
one-shot promise game.
Remark 4. We follow the main solution concept introduced by Simon & Stinchcombe (1995), namely,
strong perfect equilibrium. Simon & Stinchcombe, at the end of Section 1.1, argue that this notion best
captures the strategic structure of infinite games. Their alternative notion, weak perfect equilibrium,
replaces the strong metrics with the weak metrics in Def. 1. Weak perfection has no bite in our
setup: any subgame-perfect equilibrium of the partnership game satisfies weak perfection. Specifically,
consider the region Λcmax in which each player’s best reply is overcutting his partner’s promise (i.e.,
BRci (sj) = min (ai · sj , 1) for some ai > 0). The intuitively unstable Nash equilibrium of the promise
game (0, 0) satisfies weak perfection: if the partner uses a totally mixed strategy with expectation ǫ
ai
,
then the message 0 is ǫ away from the unique best reply message ǫ, which is sufficient for (0, 0) to
be a weak trembling-hand perfect equilibrium. By contrast, the message 0 is never a best reply to a
totally mixed message sent by the partner, which implies that it is not a (strong) trembling-hand perfect
equilibrium.
B Further Discussion of Our Evolutionary Model
In this appendix we discuss two issues related to our evolutionary interpretation of the population game:
(1) mixed and asymmetric equilibria, and (2) refinements of continuous stability.
Mixed and asymmetric equilibria in the population game Our formal results above focused
primarily on symmetric pure equilibria. In what follows we comment on the extension of our results to
mixed and asymmetric equilibria.
Theorem 2 shows that
(
λ+c , λ
+
c
)
is the unique symmetric and pure equilibrium of the population
game. Numeric analysis suggests the following stronger result also holds. The population game does
not admit any other Nash equilibrium (i.e.,
(
λ+c , λ
+
c
)
is uniquely stable when we allow also for mixed
equilibria and asymmetric equilibria).14 We leave the analysis of this conjecture for future research.
Refinements of continuous stability By using strict equilibrium and Nash equilibrium as our
solution concepts describing stable population states, we implicitly assume that a stable population
state has to be resistant only to perturbations in which a few agents change their level of reneging
aversion. Eshel (1983) argues that in some setups one should also require stability against perturbations
in which many (or all) agents slightly change their reneging aversion. Eshel presents the notion of a
continuous stable strategy to capture stability also against the latter class of perturbations, and Oechssler
& Riedel (2002) further refine it by presenting the notion of evolutionary robustness, which requires
stability against all small perturbations consistent with the weak topology (see also the related notions
14The extension to asymmetric equilibria is especially interesting in setups in which the partnership game is played between
agents from two different populations of complementary skills, and a stable state of the two populations corresponds to a
possibly asymmetric Nash equilibrium of the two-population game (see the related setup in Ritzberger & Weibull, 1995).
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of stability in Milchtaich, 2016). Population state λ∗ is evolutionarily robust if an agent with cost λ∗
outperforms other agents (on average) in any sufficiently close perturbed population state µ ∈ ∆ (R+),
i.e., ∑
λ∈∆(µ)
µ (λ) · π (λ∗, λ) >
∑
λ,λ′∈∆(µ)
µ (λ) · µ (λ′) · π (λ, λ′) . (9)
One can show that the population state
(
λ+c , λ
+
c
)
satisfies a somewhat weaker version of the evolu-
tionary robustness refinement of (9). Specifically, it satisfies the weak inequality counterpart of Eq. (9)
for any sufficiently close µ ∈ ∆ (R+), and it satisfies the strict inequality whenever µ assigns positive
mass to agents having a reneging aversion of at most λ+c . The intuition is that agents with a slightly
higher reneging aversion (i.e., strictly above λ+c ) play a no-effort equilibrium against all agents in the
perturbed state µ. Thus, they are trivially weakly outperformed by a level of aversion λ+c , and strictly
outperformed as long as µ includes some agents with a reneging aversion of at most λ+c (against whom
an agent with reneging aversion λ+c achieves strictly positive payoffs). Finally, minor modifications to
the arguments presented in the proof of Theorem 2 show that agents with a reneging aversion strictly
below λ+c are strictly outperformed by agents with a reneging aversion of λ
+
c .
C Additional Figures
The appendix presents additional figures demonstrating how the value of λ+c , level of effort, material
payoff, and subjective utility change as a function of the cost of effort c.
Figure 3 shows how the value of λ+c =
1+2c−2c2
2(c−1) +
√
5−4c
2(c−1) depends on the cost of effort c.
Figure 3: The Intermediate Reneging Aversion λ+c as a Function of the Cost of Effort c
Figure 4 shows the level of effort, xi, the material payoff of each player, πi, and the subjective
utility of each player, Ui, as a function of the cost of effort, c, in the unique equilibrium induced by the
partnership game in which both players have the intermediate level of reneging aversion λ+c .
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Figure 4: Equilibrium Effort, Material Payoff and Subjective Utility as a Function of the Cost of Effort
D Formal Statement of Results of Variants and Extensions
Result for sequential communication The choices and information sets of players is as described
in Section 6. Material payoff and utility functions and all other aspects of the game remain the same as
in the baseline model. We now state the formal result.
Proposition 2. Fix c ∈ (1, 1.25). Let (λ+c , λ+c ) be the highest symmetric pair of levels of reneging aver-
sion inducing a maximum-message equilibrium in the simultaneous communication game. The unique
subgame-perfect equilibrium induced by
(
λ+c , λ
+
c
)
under sequential communication satisfies:
1. The agents promise maximal efforts, and exert the same level of effort as in the baseline model.
2. “Second-best” outcome: If c < 1.18 then πc
(
λ+c , λ
+
c
)
> πc
(
λ
′
, λ′
)
and Uc
(
λ+c , λ
+
c
)
> Uc
(
λ
′
, λ′
)
for any λ′ 6= λ+c .
3. Convergence to “first-best” outcome: limc→1 πc
(
λ+c , λ
+
c
)
= limc→1 Uc
(
λ+c , λ
+
c
)
= 12 .
4. Strict equilibrium of population game: πc
(
λ+c , λ
+
c
)
> πc
(
λ′, λ+c
)
for each λ′ 6= λ+c .
5. Better outcome than that of the sequential-game equilibrium without reneging costs: Let πsi be the
payoff to player i in the unique equilibrium of the game where efforts are chosen sequentially (and
there are no reneging costs). Then, if c < 1.22 then πc
(
λ+c , λ
+
c
)
> 12 ·
(
πsi + π
s
j
)
.
Result for one-sided reneging costs The utility function is as defined in Eq. (7) in Section 6.
All other aspects of the partnership game remain the same as in the baseline model. Before stating
the result, we make two assumptions regarding the equilibrium selection function in cases in which the
partnership game admits multiple equilibria:
1. It turns out that the set of equilibria in the symmetric partnership game
(
λ+c , λ
+
c
)
with one-sided
reneging costs coincides with the set of equilibria in the baseline model with two-sided reneging
costs, and, thus, we apply in this case the same equilibrium selection function as in the baseline
model.
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2. Unlike in the baseline model, with one-sided reneging costs, some symmetric partnership games
(λ, λ) (with λ 6= λ+c ) have multiple equilibria. We allow in this case an arbitrary equilibrium
selection function. If an asymmetric equilibrium is selected (in which one of the agents is assigned
to the role of player one, while the partner is assigned to the role of player two), we define πc (λ, λ)
as the mean payoff of the two players’ roles. This corresponds to a homogeneous population of
agents with reneging aversion λ, in which each agent has equal probability of being assigned to
each role in the selected asymmetric equilibrium.
Proposition 3. Fix c ∈ (1, 1.25). Let (λ+c , λ+c ) be the highest symmetric pair of levels of reneging
aversion inducing a maximum-message equilibrium in the partnership game with two-sided reneging costs
(as defined in Theorem 1). The equilibrium induced by
(
λ+c , λ
+
c
)
with one-sided reneging costs has the
following properties:
1. The agents promise maximal efforts, and exert the same level of effort as in the baseline model.
2. “Second-best” outcome: If c < 1.22 then πc
(
λ+c , λ
+
c
)
> πc
(
λ
′
, λ′
)
for any λ′ 6= λ+c .
3. Convergence to “first-best” outcome: limc→1 πc
(
λ+c , λ
+
c
)
= limc→1 Uc
(
λ+c , λ
+
c
)
= 12 (which is the
best feasible material payoff).
4. Strict equilibrium of the population game: πc
(
λ+c , λ
+
c
)
> πc
(
λ′, λ+c
)
for each λ′ 6= λ+c .
5. Better outcome than that of the sequential-game equilibrium without reneging costs: Let πsi be the
payoff to player i in the unique equilibrium of the game where efforts are chosen sequentially (and
there are no reneging costs). Then, if c < 1.22 then πc
(
λ+c , λ
+
c
)
> 12 ·
(
πsi + π
s
j
)
.
Result for fixed reneging costs The utility function is as defined in Eq. (8) in Sec. 6. All other
aspects of the game remain the same as in the baseline model. We now state the formal result.
Proposition 4. For any c ∈ (1, 2), there exists an intermediate level of reneging aversion β+c , for
which there exists a trembling-hand perfect equilibrium of the partnership game with fixed reneging costs
βi = βj = β
+
c , in which both agents promise and exert the maximal effort.
Result for general utility functions Finally, we generalize the model to deal with general games
with strategic complements and show that if both agents have either too low or too high reneging costs
then essentially no effort is exerted by either player in the game.
Let π(xi, xj) be the material payoff of an agent exerting effort xi ∈ [0, 1], given that his partner exerts
effort xj ∈ [0, 1]. Throughout this extension we assume that the material payoff function, π, is twice
continuously differentiable, has positive externalities, i.e., π(xi, xj) is increasing in its second argument
(
∂π(xi,xj)
∂xj
> 0), and has strategic complements, i.e.,
∂2πi(xi,xj)
∂xi·∂xj > 0 for each xi, xj ∈ [0, 1]. Recall (see,
e.g., Milgrom & Roberts, 1990; Levin, 2003) that a game with strategic complements admits a highest
pure Nash equilibrium, which we denote by (x¯, x¯) (i.e., x, x′ ≤ x¯ for each Nash equilibrium (x, x′)).
We assume that each player i is endowed with a level of reneging aversion λi. The players’ levels of
reneging aversion are common knowledge. The subjective utility of each player i is the sum of the material
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payoff and a term representing the psychological cost of breaking a promise (reneging). Formally:
Ui(xi, xj , si, λi) = π(xi, xj)− λi ·D (|si − xi|) .
Hence, reneging is defined as exerting a level of effort not equal to the message sent (i.e., the effort
promised) in the first stage. The “size” of player i’s reneging is defined as |si − xi|. The function
D : [0, 1] → R+ determines the shape of the reneging cost function. We assume that this function is
weakly increasing (i.e., x ≥ y implies D (x) ≥ D (y)), and that D (x) > D (0) for each x > 0. That is,
any difference between the promise and the exerted effort induces a positive intrinsic cost. To simplify
notation, we normalise D such that D (0) = 0.
Our final result shows that agents do not exert effort above x¯ in any pure subgame-perfect equilibrium
of the partnership game whenever the reneging costs are either too low or too high.
Proposition 5. For any ǫ > 0, there exist λǫ > λǫ > 0, such that the effort level exerted by any agent
in any pure subgame-perfect equilibrium is at most x¯+ ǫ if either (1) λi, λj < λǫ or (2) λi, λj > λǫ.
E Proofs
E.1 Definitions of Notation Used in the Proofs
For ease of exposition, we define the following notation, used in several of the subsequent proofs:
Θi ≡ c(c+ λj) + 1
(c+ λi)(c+ λj)
− 2, Ri ≡


λj
Θi
Θi > 0
∞ Θi ≤ 0.
Throughout the proofs we define the product of ∞ and 0 to be equal to ∞. That is, when Ri =∞ and
Rj = 0, we define Ri ·Rj =∞.
E.2 Proof of Proposition 1
This section consists of several lemmas used in the proof of Proposition 1, followed by the proof itself.
E.2.1 Lemma Characterising the Best-Reply Correspondence
Lemma 1. Let µσj denote i’s expectation of sj in the first stage of the partnership game when player j
chooses a mixed strategy σj ∈ ∆([0, 1]) in the first stage (i.e., a distribution over the set of messages).
The best-reply correspondence in the first stage is15
s∗i (µσj , λi, λj , c) =


min{λj
Θi
· µσj , 1} Θi > 0 and λi > 0
1 [Θi < 0 or (Θi = 0 and λj · µσj > 0)] and λi > 0
[0, 1] [Θi = 0 and λj · µσj = 0] or λi = 0.
(10)
15The choice of the best reply in the latter “knife-edge” case, in which Θi = λj · µσj = 0, does not play any role in our
results. In all other cases, the unique best-reply function of both players always induces them to choose a pure message
and, thus, both players choose pure messages in all equilibria. This justifies the focus on pure strategies in the main text.
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Proof. To derive player i’s first stage best reply, we substitute the equations for equilibrium second-stage
effort levels (Eq. (5)) into the utility function to obtain utility as a function of si and sj :
Ui(si, sj , c) =
[(c+ λj)λisi + λjsj ][(c+ λi)λjsj + λisi]
[(c+ λi)(c+ λj)− 1]2
− c[(c+ λj)λisi + λjsj ]
2
2[(c+ λi)(c+ λj)− 1]2 −
λi
2
[
si − (c+ λj)λisi + λjsj
(c+ λi)(c+ λj)− 1
]2 (11)
When λi = 0, player i’s choice of message has no bearing on his optimal effort choice or that of his
partner and thus does not impact his utility. Therefore, any si is a best reply to any µσj (and indeed
any sj). When λi > 0, the first derivative of player i’s utility function with respect to si, taking µσj as
given, is a linear function of si and µσj :
∂Ui(si, µσj , c)
∂si
=
λi(c+ λi)(c+ λj)
[(c+ λi)(c+ λj)− 1]2
([
2− c(c+ λj)− 1
(c+ λi)(c+ λj)
]
si + λj · µσj
)
(12)
≡ Υi ·
(
−Θisi + λj · µσj
)
(13)
When λi > 0, we have Υi > 0. Given that λj and µσj are constrained to be (weakly) positive,
the second term inside the brackets in Eq. (13) is also (weakly) positive. Therefore, when Θi > 0
(and hence the term multiplying si in Eq. (13) is strictly negative), the utility function is everywhere
strictly concave in si, and the following level of si, which is positive and satisfies the first-order condition
∂Ui(si,µσj ,c)
∂si
= 0, is a necessary and sufficient condition for a global maximum of the utility function:
si(µσj , λi, λj , c) =
λj
Θi
· µσj (14)
Further, the strict concavity of the utility function in si means that when
λj
Θi
· µσj > 1, the optimal
choice of si is 1.
When Θi < 0 (and hence the term in si in Eq. (13) is strictly positive), the utility function is
everywhere strictly increasing and convex in si. In this case, the optimal choice of si is 1, for all µσj ∈ S.
When Θi = 0, if λj > 0 and µσj > 0, then again the utility function is everywhere strictly increasing and
convex in si and the optimal choice of si is 1. If Θi = 0 and either λj = 0 or µσj = 0, then the utility
function is flat in si and any message is a best reply to the opponent’s message.
E.2.2 Conditions for the Existence of Each Best-Reply “Type”
Lemma 2. Θi ≤ 0 (which implies that player i’s best reply is to send the maximum message) if and
only if
λi ≥ 1
(c+ λj)(2− c(c+ λj)) − c and λj <
2
c
− c.
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Proof. By the definition of Θi:
Θi ≤ 0 ⇐⇒ c(c+ λj) + 1
(c+ λi)(c+ λj)
− 2 ≤ 0
⇐⇒ c(c+ λj)(c+ λi) + 1
(c+ λj)
− 2(c+ λi) ≤ 0
⇐⇒ λi(c(c+ λj)− 2) ≤ 2c− 1
c+ λj
− c2(c+ λj)
⇐⇒ λi(c(c+ λj)− 2) ≤ − 1
c+ λj
− c(c(c+ λj)− 2),
where the second ⇐⇒ is obtained by multiplying by (c + λi) and the third and fourth by gathering
terms in λi and rearranging. To solve for λi we then divide by (c(c+ λj)− 2). There are two solutions:
one for when (c(c+ λj)− 2) is positive and one for when it is negative:
λi ≤ −1
(c+ λj)[c(c+ λj)− 2] − c < 0, and c(c+ λj)− 2 > 0, (15)
λi ≥ 1
(c+ λj)[2− c(c+ λj)] − c > 0, and c(c+ λj)− 2 < 0. (16)
We can see that the solution given by Eq. (15) implies that λi < 0, which is ruled out by assumption.
Therefore, we have that Θi ≤ 0 ⇐⇒ Eq. (16) holds. Rearranging the second inequality in Eq. (16) to
give a condition in terms of λj yields the lemma.
Lemma 3.
λj
Θi
> 1 (which implies that player i sends a message that is some multiple (greater than 1)
of player j’s message) if and only if
1
λ2j (1− c) + λj(2− 2c2 + c) + c(2− c2)
− c < λi
AND
((
λi <
1
(c+ λj)(2− c(c+ λj)) − c
)
or
(
2
c
− c ≤ λj < 2− c
2
c− 1
))
.
Proof. By the definition of Θi,
λj
Θi
> 1 ⇐⇒ λj
c(c+ λ−i) + 1(c+λi)(c+λj) − 2
> 1. (17)
Since λj ≥ 0, this holds if and only if
λj > c(c+ λj) +
1
(c+ λi)(c+ λj)
− 2 > 0. (18)
The second of these inequalities is the requirement that Θi > 0, which is the converse of the condition
derived for Lemma 2, and this second inequality holds when
λi <
1
(c+ λj)[2− c(c+ λj)] − c or λj ≥
2
c
− c. (19)
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The first inequality in Eq. (18) holds if and only if
λj >c(c+ λj) +
1
(c+ λi)(c+ λj)
− 2
⇐⇒λj + 2− c(c+ λj) > 1
(c+ λi)(c+ λj)
⇐⇒ (c+ λi) (λj + 2− c(c+ λj)) > 1
(c+ λj)
⇐⇒λi(λj + 2− c(c+ λj)) > −c(λj + 2− c(c+ λj)) + 1
c+ λj
. (20)
The second ⇐⇒ is obtained by multiplying by (c+ λi), and the first and third by rearranging. To solve
for λi, we divide by (λj + 2 − c(c + λj)). There are two solutions: one for when (λj + 2 − c(c + λj)) is
positive and one for when it is negative:
λi >
1
(λj + 2− c(c+ λj)) (c+ λj) − c > 0 and λj + 2− c(c+ λj) > 0, (21)
λi <
1
(λj + 2− c(c+ λj)) (c+ λj) − c < 0 and λj + 2− c(c+ λj) < 0. (22)
We can see that the solution given by Eq. (22) implies that λi < 0. This is ruled out by assumption,
and so we have that the first inequality in Eq. (18) ⇐⇒ Eq. (21) holds. Rearranging the inequalities
in Eq. (21) yields
λi >
1
λ2j (1− c) + λj(2− 2c2 + c) + c(2− c2)
− c > 0 and λj < 2− c
2
c− 1 . (23)
Combining the inequalities in Eqs. (23) and (19) and observing that 2
c
− c = 2−c2
c
<2−c
2
c−1 , and that
therefore 0 < λi <
1
(c+ λj)(2− c(c+ λj)) − c ⇒ λj <
2−c2
c−1 , yields the lemma.
Lemma 4. 0 <
λj
Θi
< 1 (which implies that player i sends a message that is some fraction (less than 1)
of player j’s message) if and only if
λi <
1
λ2j (1− c) + λj(2− 2c2 + c) + c(2− c2)
− c or λj ≥ 2− c
2
c− 1 .
Proof. The inequality 0 <
λj
Θi
< 1 implies that Θi > 0 and so Eq. (19) must hold. We also must have
that
λj
Θi
< 1. In the proof of Lemma 3 it was demonstrated that
λj
Θi
> 1 ⇐⇒ Eq. (23) holds. By taking
the converse of Eq. (23) we have that
λj
Θi
< 1 if and only if
λi <
1
λ2j (1− c) + λj(2− 2c2 + c) + c(2− c2)
− c or λj ≥ 2− c
2
c− 1 . (24)
From the proof of Lemma 3, we have that Θi > 0 if and only if
λi <
1
(c+ λj)[2− c(c+ λj)] − c or λj ≥
2
c
− c. (25)
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To see that Eq. (24) implies that Θi > 0, first note that as
2
c
− c = 2−c2
c
<2−c
2
c−1 , the second inequality
in Eq. (24) implies the second inequality in Eq. (25). Next, we see that if λj ≥ 2c − c then we clearly
have the second inequality in Eq. (25). If instead λj <
2
c
− c then, given 2
c
− c = 2−c2
c
<2−c
2
c−1 , Eq. (24)
implies that the first inequality in Eq. (24) holds, which in turn implies the first inequality in Eq. (25):
1
λ2j (1− c) + λj(2− 2c2 + c) + c(2− c2)
− c < 1
(c+ λj)[2− c(c+ λj)] − c
⇐⇒ 1
λ2j (1− c) + λj(2− 2c2 + c) + c(2− c2)
<
1
(c+ λj)[2− c(c+ λj)]
⇐⇒ (c+ λj)[2− c(c+ λj)] <λ2j (1− c) + λj(2− 2c2 + c) + c(2− c2)
⇐⇒ 2c− c2 − λjc2 + 2λj − λjc2 − λ2jc <λ2j (1− c) + λj(2− 2c2 + c) + c(2− c2)
⇐⇒ 0 <λ2j + λ2jc.
Therefore, Θi > 0 is implied by
λj
Θi
< 1 and so we obtain the lemma.
E.2.3 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. Let
g (λj , c) =
1
λ2j (1− c) + λj(2− 2c2 + c) + c(2− c2)
− c.
We prove each point in turn:
1. Overcutting: Assume that λj <
2−c2
c−1 and λi > g (λj , c). Lemma 2 and Lemma 3 imply that either
Θi ≤ 0 or λjΘi > 1. In both of these cases, Lemma 1 implies that s∗i (sj |λi, λj , c) > sj , given that
0 < sj < 1, and this proves part 1.
2. Undercutting: Lemma 4 shows that if λj ≥ 2−c2c−1 or λi ∈ (0, g (λj , c)), then 0 <
λj
Θi
< 1. Lemma 1
implies that if λi > 0 and 0 <
λj
Θi
< 1 and sj > 0, then s
∗
i (sj |λi, λj , c) < sj for each sj > 0 and
λi > 0, which proves part 2.
E.3 Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. Observe that each partnership game is identified by a pair (λi, λj) and, by the definition of Ri
(in Appendix E.1), each partnership game (and each pair (λi, λj)) corresponds to a unique pair (Ri, Rj).
Let
Λc0ef ≡
{
(λi, λj) ⊆ (0,∞)2 : Ri ·Rj < 1
}
,
Λcmax ≡
{
(λi, λj) ⊆ (0,∞)2 : min (Ri, Rj) > 1
}
, and
Λc2ms ≡
{
(λi, λj) ⊆ (0,∞)2 : min (Ri, Rj) < 1 < Ri ·Rj
}
.
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Recall that when Ri = ∞ and Rj = 0, we define Ri · Rj to be equal to ∞. Note that these sets are
disjoint and symmetric, and that
Cl
(
Λc0−eff
)
∪ Cl (Λcmax) ∪ Cl
(
Λc2−msg
)
= [0,∞)2.
We now prove each point of the theorem in turn.
1. Region of maximum-message equilibrium Λcmax:
(a) Let (λi, λj) ∈ Λcmax and let
(
s∗i , s
∗
j , x
∗
i , x
∗
j
)
∈ PE (λi, λj , c) be a trembling-hand perfect equilib-
rium. We have to prove that s∗i = s
∗
j = 1. Observe that (λi, λj) ∈ Λcmax =⇒ min (Ri, Rj) > 1.
Then, by the definition of Ri and Rj , either (i) Θi,Θj > 0, and
λj
Θi
, λiΘj > 1 , or (ii) Θi > 0 = Θj
and
λj
Θi
> 1, or (iii) Θi > 0 > Θj and
λj
Θi
> 1 , or (iv) Θi = Θj = 0, or (v) Θi = 0 > Θj , or (vi)
Θi,Θj < 0. In case (i), by the best-reply correspondence derived in Lemma 1, equilibrium mes-
sages in this class of games satisfy s∗i = min{ λjΘi sj , 1} and s∗j = min{
λi
Θj
si, 1}. These equations
are simultaneously satisfied if and only if s∗i = s
∗
j = 0 or s
∗
i = s
∗
j = 1. In case (ii), Lemma
1 implies that equilibrium messages satisfy s∗i = min{ λiΘj si, 1} and s∗j = 1 if µσj > 0 and
s∗j ∈ ∆(S) if µσj = 0. These equations are simultaneously satisfied if and only if s∗i = s∗j = 1.
In case (iii), Lemma 1 implies that equilibrium messages satisfy s∗i = min{ λiΘj si, 1} and s∗j = 1.
These equations are simultaneously satisfied if and only if s∗i = s
∗
j = 1. In case (iv), Lemma
1 implies that equilibrium messages satisfy s∗i = 1 if µσj > 0 and s
∗
i ∈ [0, 1] if µσj = 0 and
s∗j = 1 if µσi > 0 and s
∗
j ∈ [0, 1] if µσi = 0. These equations are simultaneously satisfied if and
only if s∗i = s
∗
j = 0 or s
∗
i = s
∗
j = 1. In case (v), Lemma 1 implies that equilibrium messages
satisfy s∗i = 1 if µσj > 0 and s
∗
j = 1. These equations are simultaneously satisfied if and only
if s∗i = s
∗
j = 1. In case (vi), Lemma 1 implies that equilibrium messages satisfy s
∗
i = 1 and
s∗j = 1.
This implies that in all six cases (i, ii, iii, iv, v, and vi) the strategy profile (1, 1, xe1, x
e
2) is
a subgame-perfect equilibrium. It is unique (and thus satisfies trembling-hand perfection) in
cases (ii), (iii), (v), and (vi). In cases (i) and (iv), the strategy profile (0, 0, xe1, x
e
2) is the
only additional subgame-perfect equilibrium. Finally, we have to show that the additional
equilibrium (0, 0, xe1, x
e
2) fails to satisfy trembling-hand perfection in cases (i) and (iv).
Assume to the contrary that (0, 0, xe1, x
e
2) satisfies trembling-hand perfection. This implies
that (0, 0) is the weak limit as ǫn → 0 of a sequence of ǫn-perfect equilibria
(
σni , σ
n
j
)
of the
promise game (defined in Appendix A). This implies, in particular, that for each ǫ > 0, there
exists an ǫ-perfect equilibrium (σi, σj) ∈ ∆fs ([0, 1]) 2 such that σi (1) , σj (1) < ǫ. We begin
by considering case (iv). The fact that σj has full support implies that µσj > 0 and that
BRci (σj) = {1}. The definition of an ǫ-perfect equilibrium implies that σi (1) , σj (1) > 1− ǫ,
and we get a contradiction for each ǫ < 0.5. We are left with case (i), in which Θi,Θj > 0,
and
λj
Θi
, λiΘj > 1, in which, in particular, Ri ·Rj > 1. The fact that (0, 0) is the weak limit of a
sequence of ǫn-perfect equilibria
(
σni , σ
n
j
)
when ǫn → 0 implies that for each ǫ > 0, there ex-
ists an ǫ-perfect equilibrium (σi, σj) ∈
(
∆fs ([0, 1])
)2
such that σi
([
1
Ri
, 1
])
, σj
([
1
Ri
, 1
])
< ǫ.
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The fact that σj has full support implies that µσj > 0. Observe that BR
c
i (σj) =
{
Ri · µσj
}
.
The fact that (σi, σj) is an ǫ-perfect equilibrium implies that σi
(
Ri · µσj
)
≥ 1 − ǫ, which
implies that µσi ≥ (1− ǫ) · Ri · µσj . The fact that (σi, σj) is an ǫ-perfect equilibrium implies
that σj (Rj · µσi) ≥ 1− ǫ, which implies that
µσj ≥ (1− ǫ) ·Rj · µσi ≥ (1− ǫ)2 ·Ri ·Rj · µσj ,
which yields the contradiction µσj > µσj for a sufficiently small ǫ that satisfies (1− ǫ)2·Ri·Rj >
1.
(b) Next we prove that Λcmax is a convex set, which is nonempty iff c ∈ (1, 1.25). By the definition
of Ri, we recall that Ri > 1 if and only if (1) Θi ≤ 0 or (2) Θi > 0 and λjΘi > 1. We can recall
from Lemma 2 that Θi ≤ 0 if and only if
λi ≥ 1
(c+ λj)(2− c(c+ λj)) − c and λj <
2
c
− c.
We can recall from Lemma 3 that Θi > 0 and
λj
Θi
> 1 if and only if
1
λ2j (1− c) + λj(2− 2c2 + c) + c(2− c2)
− c < λi
AND
((
λi <
1
(c+ λj)(2− c(c+ λj)) − c
)
or
(
2
c
− c ≤ λj < 2− c
2
c− 1
))
.
Combining these conditions yields Ri > 1 if and only if
λi >
1
λ2j (1− c) + λj(2− 2c2 + c) + c(2− c2)
− c and λj < 2− c
2
c− 1 . (26)
We will now show that the set of points that satisfy Eq. (26) is convex. First, observe that
the second derivative of the right-hand side of the first inequality of Eq. (26) (the lower bound
on λi) with respect to λj is
2[3c4 + (6λj − 3)c3 + (3λ2j − 9λj − 5)c2 + 3λ2j + 6λj + 4]
(λj + c)[2− c2 − λj(c− 1)] . (27)
The numerator of this expression is positive for all λj > 0 and
16 c > 1 . This expression is
therefore positive if and only if the denominator is positive, which clearly holds if and only if
the expression in square brackets is positive:
2− c2 − λj(c− 1) > 0 ⇐⇒ λj < 2− c
2
c− 1 .
This is the second inequality of Eq. (26). Therefore, the set of points that satisfy Eq. (26)
16Eq. (27) and the conditions for the positive numerator are derived using Mathematica. The code is available in the
supplementary appendix of this paper.
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lies above a strictly convex function and is therefore a convex set. By the symmetry of the
conditions for player j, we have that the set of points such that Rj > 1 is also convex.
The intersection of two convex sets is a convex set. Therefore the set of points such that
min (Ri, Rj) > 1 (Λ
c
max) is convex.
Next, we show that Λcmax is nonempty iff c ∈ (1, 1.25). By the convexity and symmetry
of Λcmax, if this set is nonempty there must be a maximum and a minimum λ such that
(λ, λ) ∈ Cl (Λcmax). We now show that such maximum and minimum elements exist if and
only if c < 1.25. Clearly, the maximum and minimum λ such that (λ, λ) ∈ Cl (Λcmax) are
the largest and smallest values of λ such that the weak counterpart of Eq. (26) holds when
λi = λj = λ. Given that Cl (Λ
c
max) is convex and closed, these maximum and minimum
values must obtain when at least one of the inequalities in Eq. (26) holds with equality. To
find the maximum and minimum values of λ that satisfy the first inequality in Eq. (26), we
solve the corresponding equation when λi = λj = λ. We then show that these are the largest
and smallest values satisfying both inequalities simultaneously. Imposing λi = λj = λ on the
first inequality in Eq. (26), we obtain
λ =
1
λ2(1− c) + λ(2− 2c2 + c) + c(2− c2) − c. (28)
Multiplying by λ2(1− c) + λ(2− 2c2 + c) + c(2− c2) and rearranging yields
λ3
[
1− c
]
+ λ2
[
2 + 2c− 3c2
]
+ λ
[
4c− 3c3 + c2
]
−
[
c2 − 1
]2
= 0. (29)
Eq. (29) has two solutions when λ is positive:
λ =
1 + 2c− 2c2
2(c− 1) −
√
5− 4c
2(c− 1) ≡ λ
−
c (30)
λ =
1 + 2c− 2c2
2(c− 1) +
√
5− 4c
2(c− 1) ≡ λ
+
c (31)
Clearly, these two solutions are defined if and only if c < 1.25 (and, thus, Λcmax = ∅ when
c ≥ 1.25). By inspection of Eq. (30) and Eq. (31), it is straightforward to see that for all
1 < c < 1.25, 0 < λ−c < λ
+
c <∞ (and, in particular, that Λcmax 6= ∅ when c < 1.25).
(c) For each c ∈ (1, 1.25), there exists (λ+c , λ+c ) ∈ Cl (Λcmax) such that (λ, λ′) ∈ Λcmax ⇒ λ, λ′ <
λ+c . Let λ
−
c and λ
+
c be defined as in Eq. (30) and Eq. (31) above. It is immediate from
the definition of λ+c in (30) that
(
λ+c , λ
+
c
) ∈ Cl (Λcmax). The definition of λ−c and λ+c as the
minimum and maximum λ (respectively) such that (λ, λ) ∈ Cl(Λcmax) and the convexity of
Λcmax, further imply that (λ, λ) /∈ Cl(Λcmax) for each λ ∈ [0, λ−c ) ∪ (λ+c ,∞). Assume that
there exist λi, λj > λ
+
c such that (λi, λj) ∈ Λcmax. By the symmetry of Λcmax, we have
that (λj , λi) ∈ Λcmax. Let λk = λi+λj2 > λ+c . By the convexity of Λcmax, we have that
(λk, λk) ∈ Λcmax, which is a contradiction. Finally, we consider the case where λi ≤ λ+c ≤ λj .
We have established in the proof of the previous part that the right-hand side of the first
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inequality in Eq. (26) (which gives the condition for Ri > 1) is strictly convex and crosses
the 45 degree line for the second time at λi = λj = λ
+
c , which implies that for all λj ≥ λ+c
this function is increasing in λj and so Ri > 1 =⇒ λi > λ+c , which is a contradiction. We
therefore have that λ+c ≤ max (λi, λj) implies that (λi, λj) /∈ Λcmax and hence (λi, λj) ∈ Λcmax
implies that max (λi, λj) < λ
+.
2. Region of two-message equilibrium Λc2ms:
(a) Let (λi, λj) ∈ Λc2ms and
(
s∗i , s
∗
j , x
∗
i , x
∗
j
)
∈ PE (λi, λj , c). Assume that 0 < λj < λi. We have
to show that s∗j < s
∗
i = 1. We prove this claim in the following three steps:
i. We first show that Rj < ∞. Assume to the contrary that Rj = ∞. This implies that
Θj ≤ 0. The fact that λj < λi implies that Θi ≤ Θj ≤ 0, which, in turn, implies that
Ri =∞, and we get a contradiction to min (Ri, Rj) < 1.
ii. Next, we show that Rj < 1 < Ri. Assume to the contrary that Ri < 1 < Rj < ∞.
Observe that
Ri −Rj = λj
Θi
− λi
Θj
=
λjΘj − λiΘi
Θi ·Θj ,
which implies that Ri < Rj iff
0 > λjΘj−λiΘi = λjc(c+λi)+ λj
(c+ λi)(c+ λj)
−2λj−λic(c+λj)− λi
(c+ λi)(c+ λj)
+2λi
= c (λj(c+ λi)− λi(c+ λj))− λi − λj
(c+ λi)(c+ λj)
+ 2 (λi − λj)
= c ((λj − λi) c)− λi − λj
(c+ λi)(c+ λj)
+ 2 (λi − λj) = (λi − λj)
(
2− c2 − 1
(c+ λi)(c+ λj)
)
= (λi − λj) (cλi −Θj) >= (λi − λj) (λi −Θj) > 0,
and we get a contradiction (where the last inequality is due to 1 < Rj <∞ ⇒ λi > Θj).
iii. The previous step and the definition of Λc2ms imply that Rj < 1 < Ri · Rj < Ri. By
the definition of Ri and Rj , either (I) Θi < 0, Θj > 0, and 0 <
λi
Θj
< 1, or (II) Θi = 0,
Θj > 0, λj > 0, and
λi
Θj
< 1, or (III) Θi > 0, Θj > 0, and
λj
Θi
· λiΘj > 1. In case (I)
Lemma 1 implies that equilibrium messages satisfy s∗i = 1. Then by Lemma 1 s
∗
j =
λi
Θj
si,
and these equations are simultaneously satisfied if and only if 1 = s∗i > s
∗
j > 0. In case
(II), Lemma 1 implies that equilibrium messages satisfy s∗i = 1 if µσj > 0 and s
∗
i ∈ [0, 1]
if µσj = 0 and s
∗
j =
λi
Θj
si. These equations are simultaneously satisfied if and only if
1 = s∗i > s
∗
j > 0 or s
∗
i = s
∗
j = 0. In case (III), Lemma 1 implies that equilibrium messages
satisfy s∗i = min{ λjΘi sj , 1} and s∗j =
λi
Θj
si. Given that
λj
Θi
· λiΘj > 1, these equations are
simultaneously satisfied if and only if 1 = s∗i > s
∗
j > 0 or s
∗
i = s
∗
j = 0. In all three cases
(I, II, and III), there exists a subgame-perfect equilibrium in which 1 = s∗i > s
∗
j > 0.
This is the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium in case (I) and therefore it must satisfy
trembling-hand perfection.
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In cases (II) and (III) there exists also a subgame-perfect equilibrium in which s∗i =
s∗j = 0. The proof that this subgame-perfect equilibrium is not trembling-hand perfect
is essentially the same as in the analogous proof in the end of part (1-a) above (for the
region Λcmax) and is omitted for brevity.
(b) Λc2ms is nonempty iff c ∈
(
1,
√
2
)
. Proposition 1 implies that if c ≥ √2, then each agent
undercuts the partner’s promise whenever the partner’s promise is positive, which implies
that Λc0ef = [0,∞)2⇒Λc2ms = ∅. The fact that Λc2ms is nonempty if c ∈
(
1,
√
2
)
is implied by
part (c) below (and the observation that c <
√
2 implies that 0 < 2
c
− c).
(c) Assume that c <
√
2 and 0 < λj <
2
c
− c. Let
g (λj , c) = max
{
1
(c+ λj)(2− c(c+ λj)) − c,
2− c2
c− 1
}
<∞.
Assume that λi > g (λj , c). In what follows we show that (λi, λj) ∈ Λc2ms. Recall that Lemma
2 says that if λj <
2
c
− c and λi > 1
(c+ λj)(2− c(c+ λj)) − c, then Θi ≤ 0, and hence Ri =∞
(using the first part of the maximum function defining g (λj , c)). Given that λi >
2−c2
c−1 > 0,
we have by Lemma 4 that 1 > Rj > 0 and so Ri ·Rj > 1 > Rj and so (λi, λj) ∈ Λc2−msg.
3. Region of no-effort equilibrium Λc0ef :
(a) Let (λi, λj) ∈ Λc0ef and
(
s∗i , s
∗
j , x
∗
i , x
∗
j
)
∈ PE (λi, λj , c). We have to show that s∗i = s∗j = 0
(which immediately implies that x∗i (
−→s ∗) = x∗j (−→s ∗) = 0 because xei (0, 0) = xej (0, 0) = 0).
The fact that (λi, λj) ∈ Λc0−eff implies that Ri · Rj < 1. By the definition of Ri and Rj , this
implies that Θi > 0 and Θj > 0 and
λj
Θi
· λiΘj < 1. By the best-reply correspondence derived
in Lemma 1, equilibrium messages in this class of games satisfy s∗i =
λj
Θi
sj and s
∗
j =
λi
Θj
si.
Given that
λj
Θi
· λiΘj < 1, these equations are jointly satisfied if and only if s∗i = s∗j = 0, which is
therefore the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium pair of messages (and, thus, also the unique
trembling hand perfect equilibrium).
(b) We have to show that there exist 0 < λc < λc, such that (λi, λj) ∈ Λc0ef if either 0 < λi, λj < λc
or λi, λj > λc. Let λc =
2−c2
c−1 and observe that Lemma 4 implies that if λi, λj > λc then
0 <
λj
Θi
< 1 and 0 < λiΘj < 1 and so Ri ·Rj < 1 and so (λi, λj) ∈ Λc0ef . In particular, if c ≥
√
2,
then Λc0ef = [0,∞). We are left with showing that for each c ∈
(
1,
√
2
)
, there exists λc > 0,
such that (λi, λj) ∈ Λc0ef for each λi, λj < λc. Recall, that Lemma 4 implies that if
λi <
1
λ2j (1− c) + λj(2− 2c2 + c) + c(2− c2)
− c (32)
and the expression holds also with i and j interchanged then Ri·Rj < 1 and (λi, λj) ∈ Λc0−eff .
Consider the right-hand side. of Eq. (32) when λj = 0: h (c) =
1
c(2− c2) − c. Observe that
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h (1) = 0, and that h is increasing in c for each c ∈
(
1,
√
2
)
as
h′ (c) = −
(
c
(
2− c2
))−2 (
2− c2
)
c (−2c)− 1 =
(
2− c2) 2c2
(c (2− c2))2 − 1 =
2
(2− c2) − 1 >∀c∈(1,
√
2) 0.
This implies that h (c) > 0 for each c ∈
(
1,
√
2
)
, which implies by continuity, that there exists
a sufficiently small λc > 0, such that the right-hand side of Eq. (32) is larger than λc for any
λj < λc. This, in turn, implies that (λi, λj) ∈ Λc0ef for each λi, λj < λc.
E.4 Corollary of Theorem 1
We formalise one corollary of Theorem 1, which says that if players’ levels of reneging aversion are
identical and positive, they send the same message in the unique perfect equilibrium of the partnership
game. This corollary is used in some subsequent proofs.
Corollary 1. Let λi = λj > 0. Then the equality si = sj holds in the unique perfect equilibrium of the
partnership game.
Proof. For λi, λj > 0, Theorem 1 shows that the only cases (those in the Λ
c
2−msg) where si 6= sj are
those where Ri · Rj > 1 > Rj . This implies that Ri 6= Rj . By the definition of Θi, we see that
λi = λj ⇒ Θi = Θj . By the definition of Ri, we see that λi = λj and Θi = Θj together imply that
Ri = Rj . Therefore λi = λj ⇒ Ri = Rj , which implies that si = sj .
E.5 Corollary of Theorem 1 and Lemma 1
Theorem 1 characterises unique equilibria in all but a “measure-zero” set of points of the reneging aversion
space that correspond to the boundaries of the three sets defined in the theorem. We demonstrate that
at the two points (λ−c , λ
−
c ) and (λ
+
c , λ
+
c ) (where λ
−
c = min{λ : (λ, λ) ∈ Cl(Λcmax)} and λ+c = max{λ :
(λ, λ) ∈ Cl(Λcmax)}), any pair of identical messages sent by the players can be supported as a perfect
equilibrium when c < 1.25. This result is used in the results of Section 4. The other boundary points
do not play a role in our analysis and we refrain from analysing them for the sake of brevity.
Corollary 2. Let c ∈ (1, 1.25) and let λi = λj = λ. (1) If λ = λ−c or λ = λ+c then
(
(s, s′) ,
(
x∗i (
−→s ) , x∗j (−→s )
))
is a perfect equilibrium of the partnership game if and only if s = s′. (2) If
(
1, x∗i , 1, x
∗
j
)
is a perfect
equilibrium of the partnership game then (λ, λ) ∈ Cl(Λcmax).
Proof. Part 1: The proof of part 1 (b) of Theorem 1 demonstrates that by the definitions λ−c = min{λ :
(λ, λ) ∈ Cl(Λcmax)} and λ+c = max{λ : (λ, λ) ∈ Cl(Λcmax)}, we have that both λi = λj = λ+c and
λi = λj = λ
−
c imply that Ri = Rj = 1. The best-reply correspondence derived in Lemma 1 then
implies that s∗i = µσj and s
∗
j = µσi , which are jointly satisfied if and only if s
∗
i = s
∗
j . In order to see
that
(
s∗i , s
∗
j , x
∗
i , x
∗
j
)
is a trembling-hand perfect equilibrium, observe that for each ǫ > 0 there exists an
ǫ-perfect equilibrium (σǫ, σǫ) ∈
(
∆fs ([0, 1])
)2
satisfying σǫ (s
∗) = 1− ǫ and µσǫ = s∗, which implies that
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(s∗, s∗) is a trembling-hand perfect equilibrium of the promise game.
Part 2: This follows from the definitions of λ−c and λ
+
c (λ
−
c = min{λ : (λ, λ) ∈ Cl(Λcmax)} and λ+c =
max{λ : (λ, λ) ∈ Cl(Λcmax)}) and from the fact that Λcmax is a convex set (part 1 (b) of Theorem 1) and
so its closure is too.
E.6 Proof of Theorem 2
This section consists of several lemmas used in the proof of Theorem 2, followed by the proof itself.
E.6.1 Lemma: Positive Payoff Always Possible in the Population Game
Lemma 5. Fix c ∈ (1, 1.25). For all λj ≥ 0 there exists λi ≥ 0 such that in any perfect equilibrium of
the partnership game (λi, λj), player i achieves a strictly positive material payoff, i.e., π(λi, λj) > 0.
Proof. Theorem 1 and the definition of Λcmax and Λ
c
2ms imply that if Ri =∞, or Rj =∞, or Ri ·Rj > 1,
then either si = 1 or sj = 1 in the unique equilibrium of the partnership game when λi, λj > 0 and in
any equilibrium when λi > λj = 0. We show that for all λj ≥ 0 there exists λi ≥ 0 such that at least
one of these conditions holds.
We first show that if λj >
81
140 then setting λi = 0 yields Θj < 0, which, by definition, implies
Rj = ∞. To see this, first use the definition of Θj to write the condition Θj < 0 when λi = 0, and
rearrange it to yield a lower bound on λj :
c2 +
1
(c+ λj)c
− 2 < 0 ⇐⇒ 1
c+ λj
< c
(
2− c2
)
⇐⇒ 1
c (2− c2) − c < λj . (33)
The first derivative of this lower bound with respect to c is
3c2 − 2
(2c− c3)2 − 1. (34)
Eq. (34) is positive for c < 1.25. The lower bound on λj given by Eq. (33) therefore attains its
highest value when c = 1.25. This value is 81140 ≈ 0.578. We therefore have that for all λj >
81
140 , λi = 0
implies that Θj < 0 and hence Rj =∞.
We next show that for λj ≤ 81140 , then for λi sufficiently large, either Θi ≤ 0 or Ri ·Rj > 1. We take
the limit of Θi as λi →∞ and find the conditions under which this is negative:
lim
λi→∞
Θi ≤ 0⇐⇒ c(c+ λj)− 2 ≤ 0⇐⇒ λj ≤ 2
c
− c. (35)
Next, we check the condition for satisfying
λi·λj
Θj ·Θi > 1, which implies that Ri · Rj > 1. We take the
limit of
λi·λj
Θi·Θj as λi →∞:
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lim
λi→∞
λi · λj
Θi ·Θj = limλi→∞

 λi
c(c+ λj) +
1
(c+λi)(c+λj)
− 2 ·
λj
c(c+ λi) +
1
(c+λi)(c+λj)
− 2


= lim
λi→∞
[
λi
c(c+ λj)− 2 ·
λj
c(c+ λi)− 2
]
= lim
λi→∞
[
λi
c(c+ λj)− 2 ·
λj
c · λi
]
= lim
λi→∞
[
λi · λj
c · λi (c(c+ λj)− 2)
]
= lim
λi→∞
[
λj
c [c(c+ λj)− 2]
]
=
λj
c [c(c+ λj)− 2] ,
where the second equality is derived from neglecting the term 1(c+λi)(c+λj) , which converges to zero as
λi →∞, in each denominator, and the third equality is derived by neglecting the term c2 − 2, which is
negligible with respect to c · λi when taking the limit λi →∞, in the second denominator.
We then determine the conditions under which this limit is greater than 1:
λj
c [c(c+ λj)− 2] > 1⇐⇒ c(c+ λj)− 2 > 0 and λj < c [c(c+ λj)− 2]
⇐⇒ 2
c
− c < λj < c
c2 − 1 − c. (36)
Observe that the first inequality in Eq. (36) holds precisely when Eq. (35) does not hold. The first
derivative of the right-hand side of the second inequality in Eq. (36) is c
2−c4−2
(c2−1)2 , which is clearly negative
for all c > 1. When evaluated at c = 1.25, the right-hand side of the second inequality in Eq. (36) is
35
36 >
81
140 . Therefore, for all c < 1.25 and λj ≤ 81140 , this second inequality holds. We therefore have that
for all c < 1.25 and λj ≤ 81140 , either Θi ≤ 0 or
λi·λj
Θj ·Θi > 1, when λi is sufficiently high. Therefore, for
all c < 1.25 and for all λj ≥ 0, there exists a λi ≥ 0 such that either si = 1 or sj = 1 in the unique
equilibrium of the game (λi, λj) (or in any equilibrium of the game when either λi = 0 or λj = 0). To
demonstrate that player i achieves positive payoff in equilibrium, we first note that in each of the above
cases, there is at least one player who both sends a positive message and (due to part 3 of Theorem 1)
has strictly positive reneging aversion, which by Eq. (5) implies that both players exert strictly positive
effort in equilibrium. Observe that a player can always guarantee a utility level of zero by playing
si = xi = 0. Further, observe that if λi > 0 then, by Lemma 1, the uniqueness of the best reply implies
that either Θi > 0 or [Θi < 0 or (Θi = 0 and λj · µσj > 0)], and therefore the utility function is either
strictly concave or strictly increasing (respectively) in si. This implies that if λi > 0 and the best reply
s∗i is positive (i.e., s
∗
i > 0) and unique, then it must yield strictly positive utility for player i. In the
case where λi = 0, given that x
∗
i > 0 and the strict concavity of the utility function in xi and the fact
that playing xi = 0 guarantees a utility level of zero, the utility of player i must be strictly positive in
equilibrium.
E.6.2 Lemma: Additional Properties of Λcmax
Lemma 6. Fix c ∈ (1, 1.24). (1) For all λ ∈ [λ−c , λ+c ), there exists δλ > 0 such that for all λ
′ ∈ (λ, λ+δλ),
(λ
′
, λ) ∈ Λcmax (2) For all λ
′ 6= λ+c , (λ
′
, λ+c ) /∈ Cl(Λcmax).
Proof. The proof of Theorem 1 yields Eq. (26) and the corresponding condition for player j, which
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together define Λcmax. The strict convexity of the first inequality of Eq. (26) defining the boundary of
Λcmax, implies that for all λ ∈ (λ−c , λ+c ), (λ, λ) is not on the boundary of Λcmax and is therefore in the
interior of Λcmax (i.e., it is in Λ
c
max but not in Cl(Λ
c
max)) . By the definition of an interior point of a
convex set, for all λ ∈ (λ−c , λ+c ), there exists δλ > 0 such that for all λ
′ ∈ [λ, λ+ δλ), (λ′ , λ) ∈ Λcmax. We
next show that there exists δλ > 0 such that for all λ
′ ∈ (λ−c , λ−c + δλ), (λ
′
, λc) ∈ Λcmax. This will be the
case if and only if there is δλ > 0 such that Eq. (26) holds whenever λi = λ
−
c and λj ∈ [λ−c , λ−c + δλ).
This will be the case if and only if Eq. (26) does not become “tighter” as λj increases, i.e., if and only
if the derivative of the right-hand side of the first inequality of Eq. (26) is less than or equal to zero
when evaluated at λj = λ
−
c . The derivative of the right-hand side of the first inequality of Eq. (26) with
respect to λj is
c(2c+ 2λj − 1)− 2(1 + λj)
(λj + c)2[λj(c− 1) + c2 − 2]2 . (37)
When evaluated at λj = λ
−
c , Eq. (37) is nonpositive if
17 c >
√
5− 1 ≈ 1.24. Therefore, we have that
for all λ ∈ [λ−c , λ+c ), there exists δλ > 0 such that for all λ
′ ∈ (λ, λ+ δλ), (λ′ , λ) ∈ Λcmax.
Point (2) is established by noting first that the right-hand side of the first inequality of Eq. (26) must
be increasing in λj when evaluated at λ
+
c (and at any λ > λ
+
c ) as this is the second point at which this
strictly convex function crosses the 45 degree line (the first being λ−c ). Therefore, given that λ
+
c satisfies
Eq. (28), an increase in λj with λi fixed at λ
+
c means that the weak counterpart of Eq. (26) does not
hold. By symmetry, an increase in λi with λj fixed at λ
+
c means that the equivalent condition on λj is
violated. Secondly, it is straightforward to see that given that λ+c satisfies Eq. (28), when λj is fixed at
λ+c , any λi < λ
+
c must violate the weak counterpart of the first inequality in Eq. (26). Therefore, for
any λ
′ 6= λ+c , min(Ri, Rj) < 1 and so (λ
′
, λ+c ) /∈ Cl(Λcmax).
E.6.3 Proof of Theorem 2
Proof. We prove each part of the theorem in turn.
1. By the definition of Ri, λi = λj =⇒ Ri = Rj , which in turn implies that either max {Ri, Rj} < 1
and hence Ri·Rj < 1 and (λi, λj) ∈ Λc0ef or min {Ri. Rj} ≥ 1 and hence (λi, λj) ∈ Cl(Λcmax).
Therefore, λi = λj =⇒ (λi, λj) ∈ Cl (Λcmax)∪Λc0ef . For any λ such that (λ, λ) ∈ Λc0ef , xi = xj = 0
and so π(λ, λ) = 0. To find the material payoff and subjective utility of each player when (λ, λ) ∈
Cl(Λcmax), we impose si = sj = 1 and λi = λj = λ on the equation for equilibrium effort (Eq. 5):
(c+ λ)λ+ λ
(c+ λ)(c+ λ)− 1 =
λ
c+ λ− 1 , (38)
and then we substitute xi = xj =
λ
c+ λ− 1 and si = sj = 1 on Eq. (1) and Eq. (2) to get the
equilibrium material payoff and subjective utility, respectively:
πc(λ, λ) =
(
λ
c+ λ− 1
)2 (
1− c
2
)
, Uc(λ, λ) =
(
λ
c+ λ− 1
)2 (
1− c
2
)
− λ
2
(
c− 1
c+ λ− 1
)2
. (39)
17This final result is obtained using Mathematica. The code is available in the supplementary appendix of this paper.
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It is immediate that the material payoff is increasing in λ, and, therefore, that the maximal
material payoff is obtained at
(
λ+c , λ
+
c
)
, which is the maximal symmetric point in Cl(Λcmax) (i.e.,
π
(
λ+c , λ
+
c
)
> π
(
λ
′
, λ′
)
for any λ′ 6= λ+c ). We are left to show that the maximal subjective utility
is obtained at
(
λ+c , λ
+
c
)
. Taking the derivative of the subjective utility yields18:
∂Uc(λ, λ)
∂λ
=
(c− 1)[(3− c)λ− (c− 1)2]
2(c+ λ− 1)3 . (40)
Observe that the denominator is always positive and that the numerator is positive for each c ∈
(1, 3) and λ > (c−1)
2
3−c . Recall that the minimal value of λ in Λ
c
max is λ
−
c ≡ 1+2c−2c
2
2(c−1) −
√
5−4c
2(c−1) . Thus,
we are left with showing that
λ−c ≡
1 + 2c− 2c2
2(c− 1) −
√
5− 4c
2(c− 1) >
(c− 1)2
3− c .
We use Mathematica to show that this inequality is satisfied for each c ∈ (1, 1.25), which completes
the proof (the code is available in the supplementary appendix).
2. Recall that
λ+c =
1 + 2c− 2c2
2(c− 1) +
√
5− 4c
2(c− 1) =
1 + 2c(1− c) +√5− 4c
2(c− 1) . (41)
Note that as c → 1, the numerator of Eq. (41) is increasing and the denominator of Eq. (41)
converges to zero. Hence limc→1 λ+c = ∞. To find the limit of the players’ material payoff in the
game (λ+c , λ
+
c ) as c→ 1, we substitute the expression for effort in a maximum-message equilibrium
(Eq. 38) into that for the payoffs in a symmetric equilibrium (Eq. (39) and Eq. (2)) when λ = λ+c :
πc(λ
+
c , λ
+
c ) =
(
λ+c
c+ λ+c − 1
)2 (
1− c
2
)
, Uc(λ
+
c , λ
+
c ) =
(
λ+c
c+ λ+c − 1
)2 (
1− c
2
)
− λ
2
(
c− 1
c+ λ− 1
)2
(42)
As c→ 1, λ+c →∞ and therefore the limits of Eq. (42) are given by
lim
c→1
πc(λ
+
c , λ
+
c ) = lim
c→1
(
λ+c
c+ λ+c − 1
)2 (
1− c
2
)
= (1− 1
2
) =
1
2
. (43)
lim
c→1
Uc(λ
+
c , λ
+
c ) = lim
c→1
((
λ+c
c+ λ+c − 1
)
2
(
1− c
2
)
− λ
2
(
c− 1
c+ λ− 1
)2)
=
1
2
− 0 = 1
2
. (44)
3. We first show that any unilateral deviation from the candidate equilibrium to a lower level of
reneging aversion yields a strictly lower payoff, i.e., πc
(
λ
′
, λ+c
)
< πc(λ
+
c , λ
+
c ) for λ
′ ∈ [0, λ+c ) .
Point (2) of Lemma 6 implies that for all λ
′ ∈ [0, λ+c ),
(
λ
′
, λ+c
)
/∈ Cl(Λcmax). Therefore for all such
deviations,
(
λ
′
, λ+c
)
∈ Cl
(
Λc2−msg
)
or
(
λ
′
, λ+c
)
∈ Cl
(
Λc0ef
)
. Suppose first that
(
λ
′
, λ+c
)
∈ Λc0ef .
Then the effort levels of both players are zero and so we have πc
(
λ+c , λ
+
c
)
> πc(λ
′
, λ+c ) = 0. Suppose
instead that
(
λ
′
, λ+c
)
∈ Λc2ms; the payoff to the deviating player is obtained by substituting the
18This derivative is obtained using Mathematica. The code is available in the supplementary appendix of this paper.
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expression for equilibrium effort (Eq. 5) into the expression for material payoff (Eq. 1) and
imposing the conditions si =
λj
Θi
and sj = 1 and λj = λ
+
c (player i is therefore the deviating
player):
πc(λi, λ
+
c ) =
[(c+ λ+c )λi
λj
Θi
+ λ+c ][(c+ λi)λ
+
c + λi
λj
Θi
]
[(c+ λi)(c+ λ
+
c )− 1]2 −
c[(c+ λ+c )λi
λj
Θi
+ λ+c ]
2
2[(c+ λi)(c+ λ
+
c )− 1]2 . (45)
The derivative of this expression with respect to λi is
19
[λ+c ]
2(c(λ+c + c)− 1)2
[1 + (c+ λ+c )(c+ λi)(c(λ
+
c + c)− 2)]3 . (46)
Clearly, the numerator of Eq. (46) is always positive. A sufficient condition for the denominator,
and hence for the whole expression, to be strictly positive is that
c(λ+c + c)− 2 > 0 ⇐⇒ λ+c >
2
c
− c. (47)
This always holds as
λ+c =
1 + 2c− 2c2
2(c− 1) +
√
5− 4c
2(c− 1) >
2
c
− c
⇐⇒ 1 + 2c− 2c2 +√5− 4c > 4(c− 1)
c
− 2c(c− 1)
⇐⇒ − 3 +√5− 4c+ 4
c
> 0 ⇐⇒ c < 1.25,
where the final ⇐⇒ follows from the fact that √5− 4c is positive and defined if and only
if c < 1.25 and 4
c
− 3 is positive for all c < 1.33. Therefore, π (λ+c , λ+c ) > π(λ′ , λ+c ) for any
λ
′ ∈ [0, λ+c ) such that
(
λ
′
, λ+c
)
∈ Λc2−msg. Finally, suppose that
(
λ
′
, λ+c
)
∈ {Cl(Λ2ms) \ Λ2ms} ={(
λi, λ
+
c
) ⊆ [0,∞)2 : Ri ·Rj = 1 > Ri}. By Lemma 1 we have that any equilibrium will satisfy
si =
λj
Θi
sj and sj = min
{
λj
Θi
si, 1
}
. Substituting the expression for equilibrium effort (Eq. 5) into
the expression for material payoff (Eq. 1) and imposing this form of best reply yields utility to
player i (the deviating player):
πc(λi, λ
+
c ) =

 [(c+ λ+c )λi λjΘi + λ+c ][(c+ λi)λ+c + λi λjΘi ]
[(c+ λi)(c+ λ
+
c )− 1]2 −
c[(c+ λ+c )λi
λj
Θi
+ λ+c ]
2
2[(c+ λi)(c+ λ
+
c )− 1]2

 s2j . (48)
Clearly, the highest possible payoff to player i in any possible equilibrium is that where sj = 1.
In this case, the equilibrium payoff is of the same form as Eq. (45) and, by the above arguments,
it cannot represent a profitable deviation. We therefore have that π
(
λ
′
, λ+c
)
< π(λ+c , λ
+
c ) for
λ
′ ∈ [0, λ+c ). We now show that a unilateral deviation from the candidate equilibrium to a higher
reneging aversion yields a strictly lower payoff, i.e., π
(
λ
′
, λ+c
)
< π(λ+c , λ
+
c ) for λ
′
> λ+c . By Lemma
6, λ
′
> λ+c implies that
(
λ
′
, λ+c
)
/∈ Cl (Λcmax) . Suppose first that
(
λ
′
, λ+c
)
∈ Λc0ef . In this case,
19This derivative was calculated using Mathematica. The code is available in the supplementary appendix of this paper.
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the effort levels of both players are zero and so we have πc
(
λ+c , λ
+
c
)
> πc(λ
′
, λ+c ) = 0. Suppose
instead that
(
λ
′
, λ+c
)
∈ Λc2−msg. In this case, the payoff to the deviating player is obtained by
substituting the expression for equilibrium effort (Eq. 5) into the expression for material payoff
(Eq. 1) and imposing the conditions si = 1 and sj =
λi
Θj
and λj = λ
+
c (player i is therefore the
deviating player):
πc(λi, λ
+
c ) =
[(c+ λ+c )λi + λ
+
c
λi
Θj
][(c+ λi)λ
+
c
λi
Θj
+ λi]
[(c+ λi)(c+ λ
+
c )− 1]2 −
c[(c+ λ+c )λi + λ
+
c
λi
Θj
]2
2[(c+ λi)(c+ λ
+
c )− 1]2 . (49)
In the supplementary appendix of this paper, we present the explicit formula for the deriva-
tive of Eq. (49) with respect to λi and the Mathematica code proving that this derivative is
strictly negative for all λi > λ
+
c . Hence, for any λi > λ
+
c such that (λi, λ
+
c ) ∈ Λc2ms, we
have that πc
(
λi, λ
+
c
)
< πc(λ
+
c , λ
+
c ). Finally, suppose that
(
λ
′
, λ+c
)
∈ {Cl(Λ2ms) \ Λ2ms} ={(
λi, λ
+
c
) ⊆ [0,∞)2 : Ri ·Rj = 1 > Rj}. By arguments analogous to the case where λi < λ+c , we
have that the maximum possible payoff from deviating in this case is of the form given by Eq. (49)
and therefore not profitable. Hence for any λi > λ
+
c , πc
(
λi, λ
+
c
)
< πc(λ
+
c , λ
+
c ).
Therefore, we have shown that any possible deviation from the pure strategy equilibrium (λ+c , λ
+
c )
yields the deviating player a strictly lower payoff and hence this equilibrium is strict.
4. In the sequential game (with no reneging costs) let player i make his effort choice first with
player j best-replying to this. Then, in equilibrium, xj = argmax
xj
{
xixj − c·x
2
j
2
}
=
xj
c
and hence
xi = argmax
xi
{
x2
i
c
− c·x2i2
}
= argmax
xi
{
(2−c2)xi
2c
}
= 1, where the last equality follows from the fact
that c < 1.25. Therefore, in an equilibrium with sequential effort choices, xi = 1, xj =
1
c
, and the
mean payoff is 1
c
− c4(1 + 1c2 ) = 3−c
2
4c . The payoff to either player in the equilibrium induced by
(λ+c , λ
+
c ) is given by Eq. (42). We then have that
πc(λ
+
c , λ
+
c ) >
1
2
·
(
πsi + π
s
j
)
⇐⇒ [ λ
+
c
c+ λ+c − 1]
2[1− c
2
] >
3− c2
4c
⇐⇒ c < 1.22.
The final step is proven using Mathematica (code is available in the supplementary appendix).
5. Recall from part 1 that λi = λj =⇒ (λi, λj) ∈ Cl(Λcmax) ∪ Λc0ef . We consider these two sets of
symmetric strategy profiles in turn and show that no candidate equilibria of the population game
survive other than (λ+c , λ
+
c ) when c ∈ (1, 1.24). For any λ such that the unique equilibrium in
the corresponding partnership game (λ, λ) ∈ Λ0ef , we have that π (λ, λ) = 0. Lemma 5 shows
that for c < 1.25 and for λ ≥ 0, there exists λ′ ≥ 0 such that π
(
λ
′
, λ
)
> 0. Therefore, for all
λ such that π (λ, λ) = 0, (λ, λ) cannot be a Nash equilibrium of the population game. For any λ
such that (λ, λ) ∈ Cl(Λcmax), we say that such an equilibrium “admits an upward deviation within
Λcmax” if there exists δλ > 0 such that for all λ
′ ∈ (λ, λ+ δλ), (λ′ , λ) ∈ Λcmax . For all λ such that
(λ, λ) ∈ Cl(Λcmax), the equilibrium payoff to both players is obtained by substituting si = sj = 1
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into Eq. (11):
πc(λi, λj) =
[(c+ λj)λi + λj ][(c+ λi)λj + λi]
[(c+ λi)(c+ λj)− 1]2 −
c[(c+ λj)λi + λj ]
2
2[(c+ λi)(c+ λj)− 1]2 . (50)
The first derivative of this function with respect to λi is
(c− 1)(1 + c+ λj)[λic3 + 2c2λiλj + cλi(λ2j − λj − 2)− λj(1 + λi(2 + λj))]
[c2 − 1 + λiλj + c(λi + λj)]3 . (51)
Imposing the condition λi = λj = λ, we can simplify this expression to
20
(c− 1)[c(c+ λ− 1)− 1− λ]λ
[c+ 1 + λ][c− 1 + λ]3 . (52)
This expression is strictly positive if and only if
c(c+ λ− 1)− 1− λ > 0 ⇐⇒ λ < 1 + c− c
2
c− 1 . (53)
Recall from Theorem 1 and Corollary 2 that a maximum-message equilibrium exists only if
min(Ri, Rj) ≥ 1 and that this requires that either Θi ≤ 0 or λjΘi ≥ 1 (and that the analogous
conditions hold for j). By Lemma 2 and Lemma 3 each of these conditions implies that
λj <
2− c2
c− 1 . (54)
Therefore, when λi = λj = λ, we have that
λ <
2− c2
c− 1 <
1 + c− c2
c− 1 , (55)
where the second inequality clearly follows when c > 1. We can see that this yields the second
inequality in Eq. (53) and hence Eq. (52) is always positive in a maximum-message equilibrium.
Therefore, for any λ such that (λ, λ) “admits an upward deviation within Λcmax,” there exists some
λ
′
> λ such that πc
(
λ
′
, λ
)
> πc(λ, λ) and hence no such strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium of
the population game. We have shown that the only potential symmetric pure Nash equilibria of
the population game are those that admit a maximum-message equilibrium and do not “admit an
upward deviation within Λcmax.” Lemma 6 implies that there is a unique pair (λ
+
c , λ
+
c ) that fulfills
these conditions when c ∈ (1, 1.24).
20The derivative given by Eq. (51) and its simplification when λi = λj is obtained using Mathematica. The code available
in the supplementary appendix of this paper.
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E.7 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. We solve for the subgame-perfect equilibria of this game using backwards induction. Best replies
and equilibrium choices of effort in the last stage are the same function of prior-stage messages as in the
games with simultaneous communication and are given by Eq. (4) and Eq. (5). Utility as a function
of messages is therefore given by Eq. (6). We first note that Section 3.2 demonstrated that if Θi ≤ 0
then (other than in the “knife edge” case where Θk = 0 and λl · sl = 0 for k = i and l = j or for k = j
and l = i), regardless of player j’s choice of message, player i’s level of utility is always increasing in his
message, and his optimal choice is si = 1 for any message sent by j. In the “knife edge” cases where
Θi = 0 (i.e., where player i is the first player to make a promise) and Rj 6= 0 and λj 6= 0, then player j
will respond to any positive promise with sj = min{Rjsi, 1} > 0, meaning that i’s utility is convex and
increasing in his message and he chooses si = 1. In the “knife edge” cases where Θj = 0 and Ri 6= 0,
player i knows that playing si > 0 will induce sj = 1. Given that playing si = min{Risj , 1} is a best
reply when taking sj = 1 as given in the simultaneous game, it must also be a best reply in the sequential
game. Therefore, if either Θi ≤ 0 or Θj ≤ 0 or both of these conditions hold, equilibrium messages and
effort levels will be the same under sequential communication as under simultaneous communication.21
In the case where Θi,Θj > 0, the second-stage best reply of player j (the second player to make
a promise) is derived in the same way as the first-stage best reply under simultaneous communication,
except that instead of the expectation of player i’s promise, we derive the best reply as a function
of his actual promise. From the analysis in Section 3.2 we therefore know that player j will choose
sj = min{Rjsi, 1}.
Next, we analyse the choice of player i taking j’s second-stage best reply function as given. First, we
show that when Θi,Θj > 0, there exists no equilibrium in which si ∈ (0,min{ 1Rj , 1}). Note that when
Θi,Θj > 0, then Rj <∞ and so, for si ∈ (0,min{ 1Rj , 1}), inserting the best reply sj = min{Rjsi, 1} =
Rjsi into Eq. (5) and substituting this into player i’s utility function yields
Ui(si, c) =
[(c+ λj)λisi + λjRjsi][(c+ λi)λjRjsi + λisi]
[(c+ λi)(c+ λj)− 1]2
− c[(c+ λj)λisi + λjRjsi]
2
2[(c+ λi)(c+ λj)− 1]2 −
λi
2
[
si − (c+ λj)λisi + λjRjsi
(c+ λi)(c+ λj)− 1
]2
=Ψ(λi, λj , c) s
2
i .
(56)
Here, Ψ (λi, λj , c) is a function of the parameters λi, λj , c only. Therefore, if there exists s
′
i ∈
(0,min{ 1
Rj
, 1}) such that Ui(s′i, c) > 0, then Ui(si, c) < Ui(min{ 1Rj , 1}, c) for all si ∈ (0,min{ 1Rj , 1}).
Conversely, if there exists s
′
i ∈ (0,min{ 1Rj , 1}) such that Ui(s
′
i, c) < 0, then Ui(s
′
i, c) < Ui(0, c) for all
si ∈ (0,min{ 1Rj , 1}).
Consider first the case where Rj ≤ 1. The fact that there exists no equilibrium in which si ∈
(0,min{ 1
Rj
, 1}) implies that if Rj ≤ 1, then player i’s optimal choice is si = 1 if his utility following the
21In the case where Θk = 0 and [λl = 0 or Rl = 0] for k = i or k = j, multiple equilibria are possible. Our results are
invariant to what is assumed about equilibrium selection in this case. For ease of exposition, we assume that players in this
case play si = 1 and sj = 0.
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subsequent equilibrium play is positive (i.e., if Ψ > 0) and the optimal choice is si = 0 otherwise (as this
message guarantees a utility level of zero). We know from the analysis of simultaneous communication
that if RiRj ≥ 1 ≥ Rj , then there exists an equilibrium in which si = 1 and sj = Rj and hence
the utility of player i is positive in this case and in the corresponding candidate equilibrium under
sequential communication (as subsequent effort levels are identical following simultaneous or sequential
communication of the same pair of messages). Therefore if RiRj ≥ 1 ≥ Rj , then si = 1 is a unique best
reply and there is a unique equilibrium in which si = 1 and sj = Rj . This equilibrium under sequential
communication yields the same utility levels and payoffs to both players as that under simultaneous
communication. If RiRj < 1 then there exists either a unique equilibrium in which si = 1 and sj = Rj
or a unique equilibrium in which si = 0 and sj = 0. In the latter case, the utility levels and payoffs are
the same as under simultaneous communication. In the former case, they are strictly greater for both
players.
Consider next the case in which Rj > 1. We have thus far shown that i’s best reply is either 0 or
in [ 1
Rj
, 1]. We first consider the optimal choice of message from the interval [ 1
Rj
, 1]. For all si ∈ [ 1Rj , 1],
j’s best reply is fixed, sj = 1. Player i chooses his message taking j’s choice as given, which is the
same optimisation problem as under simultaneous communication. From Section 3.2 we know that i’s
best reply from this interval is therefore si = min
{
max{Ri, 1Rj }, 1
}
. From Section 3.2 we know that if
min (Ri, Rj) ≥ 1, then there exists an equilibrium under simultaneous communication in which si = sj =
1 and both players achieve positive utility. This implies that if Ri ≥ 1 (and hence min (Ri, Rj) ≥ 1) then
there is a unique subgame-perfect equilibrium under sequential communication in which si = sj = 1.
If Ri < 1 and RiRj ≥ 1 > Ri then i’s optimal choice is Ri so long as this yields positive utility. We
know from Section 3.2 that if RiRj ≥ 1 > Ri then there exists an equilibrium under simultaneous
communication in which si = Ri and sj = 1 and hence the same messages form part of the unique
subgame-perfect equilibrium with sequential communication. This equilibrium yields the same utility
levels and payoffs to both players as under simultaneous communication. If RiRj < 1 then Ri <
1
Rj
and
there exists either a unique equilibrium in which si =
1
Rj
and sj = 1 or a unique equilibrium in which
si = 0 and sj = 0. In the latter case, the utility levels and payoffs are the same as under simultaneous
communication. In the former case, they are strictly greater for both players.
We have therefore seen that if either (Θi ≤ 0 or Θj ≤ 0 [or both]) or (Θi > 0 and Θj > 0 and
RiRj ≥ 1), then there is a unique equilibrium in which (1) players’ payoffs are invariant to whether they
send their message first or second and hence to the method by which nature selects the first mover, and
(2) both players’ messages, efforts, and payoffs are the same as under simultaneous communication. If
Θi > 0 and Θj > 0 and RiRj < 1 and Rj < 1, then in equilibrium either (si = 1 and sj = Rj) or
(si = 0 and sj = 0). If Θi > 0 and Θj > 0 and Rj ≥ 1 > RiRj , then in equilibrium either (si = 1Rj
and sj = 1) or (si = 0 and sj = 0); i.e., when Θi > 0 and Θj > 0 and RiRj < 1 we have that (1)
equilibrium messages, efforts and payoffs may depend on which player is selected to send their message
first, and (2) payoffs may be strictly greater under sequential communication than under simultaneous
communication.
We can now see that under sequential communication,
(
λ+c , λ
+
c
)
induces the same messages, effort
levels, and payoffs as under simultaneous communication (point 1 of the proposition) by noting that
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in the partnership game induced by the pair
(
λ+c , λ
+
c
)
, by the definition of λ+c we have min (Ri, Rj) ≥
1 =⇒ RiRj ≥ 1. We next establish that
(
λ+c , λ
+
c
)
remains a strict Nash equilibrium of the population
game (point 4 of the proposition). Consider a deviation to λ
′ 6= λ+c . Recall from Lemma 6 that
λ
′ 6= λ+c =⇒
(
λ
′
, λ+c
)
/∈ Cl(Λmax) and hence min{Ri, Rj} < 1. First, consider a deviation to λ′ < λ+c .
We show that this implies that for player k, with λk = λ
+
c , we have that Rk > 1 (with k = i or k = j,
depending on which player is selected to send his message first). To see this, observe that as established
in the proof of Theorem 2 (specifically in Eq. (27)), the set of points satisfying Eq. (26) is convex. If
we can establish that in the game induced by
(
0, λ+c
)
we have Rk > 1, then for λ
′ ∈ [0, λ+c ] we have
that in the game induced by
(
λ
′
, λ+c
)
, Rk > 1. Reproducing Eq. (26) but imposing λi = λk = λ
+
c and
λj = λ
′
= 0, we have that Rk > 1 if
λ+c >
1
(λ′)2(1− c) + λ′(2− 2c2 + c) + c(2− c2) − c and λ
′
<
2− c2
c− 1
⇐⇒ λ+c >
1
c(2− c2) − c and 0 <
2− c2
c− 1
⇐⇒ 1 + 2c− 2c
2
2(c− 1) +
√
5− 4c
2(c− 1) >
1
c(2− c2) − c,
which holds for all c ∈ [1, 1.25] . Hence we have that Rk > 1. Given that min{Ri, Rj} < 1, we have
that either Ri > 1 > Rj or Rj > 1 > Ri. If Ri > 1 > Rj then as shown above either (1) the payoff in
equilibrium is the same as under simultaneous communication, or (2) there is an equilibrium in which
si = 1 and sj = Rj . If Rj > 1 > Ri then as shown above either (3) the payoff in equilibrium is zero
to both players, or (4) there is an equilibrium in which si =
1
Rj
and sj = 1. The proof of part 3 of
Theorem 2 shows that for any
(
λ
′
, λ+c
)
such that λ
′
< λ+c , πc
(
λ
′
, λ+c
)
< πc
(
λ+c , λ
+
c
)
in the simultaneous
communication setup and therefore, in cases (1) and (3) any deviation yields a strictly lower payoff also
in the sequential setup. The proof of part 3 of Theorem 2 also shows that for any
(
λi, λ
+
c
)
such that
λi ≤ λ+c , if sj = 1 and si = Ri, then πc
(
λi, λ
+
c
)
< πc
(
λ+c , λ
+
c
)
. Given that play following any given pair
of messages is the same in both the sequential and simultaneous setups, it is therefore the case that in
case (2) deviation also yields a strictly lower payoff. In case (4), the equilibrium payoff to player i is
given by substituting sj = 1, si =
1
Rj
, λi = λ
′
, and λj = λ
+
c into the expressions for the second-stage
effort choices given by Eq. (5) and substituting the resulting expression into Eq. (1). Simplifying the
resulting expression yields 22
[(c(c+ λ
′
)− 1][c− 3c√5− 4c+ c3(1 +√5− 4c) + c2λ′(1 +√5− 4c)− 2(2 + λ′ +√5− 4cλ′)]
2(1 +
√
5− 4c)(c+ λ′)2 . (57)
The payoff π
(
λ+c , λ
+
c
)
is obtained by substituting λi = λj = λ
+
c and si = sj = 1 into Eq. (5) and
substituting the resulting expression into Eq. (1). Simplifying the resulting expression yields23
(c− 2)(1 +√5− 4c− 2(c− 1)c)2
2(3 +
√
5− 4c− 2c)2 . (58)
22This simplification was obtained using Mathematica. The code is available in the supplementary appendix of this paper.
23This simplification was obtained using Mathematica. The code is available in the supplementary appendix of this paper.
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The value of Eq. (58) is strictly greater than that of Eq. (57) for all λ
′
< λ+c for all
24 c < 1.25. Therefore,
in all possible cases (1), (2), (3) and (4), if λk = λ
+
c then a deviation by player l from λ
+
c to λ
′
< λ+c
yields a strictly lower payoff and hence for λ
′
< λ+c , we have that π
(
λ
′
, λ+c
)
< π
(
λ+c , λ
+
c
)
.
Next, consider a deviation to λl = λ
′
> λ+c = λk. This implies that Rl > 1 as, given that the
pair
(
λ+c , λ
+
c
)
satisfies Eq. (26), if λl > λ
+
c then the pair
(
λ
′
c, λ
+
c
)
must also satisfy Eq. (26) with
l = i and k = j, as λi is increased while λj stays constant. Hence we have that Ri > 1 > Rj or
Rj > 1 > Ri (depending on whether player k or l is selected to play first), and again either (1) the
payoffs in equilibrium are the same as under simultaneous communication, or (2) there is an equilibrium
in which si = 1 and sj = Rj , or (3) the payoff in equilibrium is zero to both players, or (4) there is an
equilibrium in which si =
1
Rj
and sj = 1. Part 3 of Theorem 2 shows that for any
(
λ
′
, λ+c
)
such that
λ
′
> λ+c , it is the case that πc
(
λ
′
, λ+c
)
< πc
(
λ+c , λ
+
c
)
in the simultaneous communication setup, and that
for λi > λ
+
c and following messages of si = 1 and sj = Rj , the payoff to player i is strictly lower than
πc
(
λ+c , λ
+
c
)
. Therefore, in cases (1), (2), and (3), deviation to λ
′
> λ+c leads to a strictly lower payoff.
In case (4), the equilibrium payoff to player j (the deviator) is given by substituting si =
1
Rj
and sj = 1
and λi = λ
+
c into the expressions for the second-stage effort choices given by Eq. (5) and substituting
the resulting expression into Eq. (1). Simplifying the resulting expression yields25
√
5− 4c+ c− 2
2
+
(3−√5− 4c)(2λ′ + c) + 2(λ′)2
4(c+ λ′)2
. (59)
The value of Eq. (58) is strictly greater than that of Eq. (59) for all λ
′
< λ+c for all
26 c < 1.25. Therefore
in all possible cases (1), (2), (3) and (4), if λk = λ
+
c then deviation by player l from λ
+
c to λ
′
< λ+c yields
a strictly lower payoff and hence for λ
′ 6= λ+c we have that πc
(
λ
′
, λ+c
)
< πc
(
λ+c , λ
+
c
)
and
(
λ+c , λ
+
c
)
is a
strict equilibrium of the game with sequential communication.
That points 3 and 5 of Theorem 2 also hold in the sequential setup follows from the fact that
πc
(
λ+c , λ
+
c
)
is the same under both forms of communication (these results are points 3 and 5 of the
proposition).
Finally, we prove that if c < 1.18, then πc
(
λ+c , λ
+
c
)
> πc
(
λ
′
, λ
′
)
and Uc
(
λ+c , λ
+
c
)
> Uc
(
λ
′
, λ
′
)
for
any λ′ 6= λ+c (point 2 of the theorem). If λi = λj = λ
′
, this implies min{Ri, Rj} ≥ 1 or Ri · Rj < 1. In
the former case, material payoffs and subjective utilities are the same as in the game with simultaneous
communication, which by point 1 of Theorem 2 are less than π
(
λ+c , λ
+
c
)
. In the latter case, either the
effort choices are the same as in the game with simultaneous communication (and both players’ material
payoffs and subjective utilities are zero and therefore less than πc
(
λ+c , λ
+
c
)
and Uc
(
λ+c , λ
+
c
)
, respectively)
or there is an equilibrium in which si = 1 and sj = Rj . In the latter of these two cases, material payoffs
to players i and j can be obtained by substituting λi = λj = λ
′
and si = 1 and sj = Rj into Eq. (5) and
substituting the resulting expression into Eq. (1) and the corresponding equation for player j. Letting
24This result is obtained using Mathematica. The code is available in the supplementary appendix of this paper.
25This simplification was obtained using Mathematica. The code is available in the supplementary appendix of this paper.
26This result is obtained using Mathematica. The code is available in the supplementary appendix of this paper.
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πi
(
λ
′
, λ
′
)
denote the payoff to the player selected to send his message first, we have that
πi
(
λ
′
, λ
′
)
=
(λ
′
)2(c+ λ
′
)[1− c(c+ λ′)][2 + (c+ λ′)[−2λ′ + c(c2 + cλ′ − 3)]]
2[1 + (c+ λ′)2(−2 + c(c+ λ′))]2 .
Player j’s payoff is
πj
(
λ
′
, λ
′
)
=
(λ
′
)2(c+ λ
′ − 1)(1 + c+ λ′)[c(c+ λ′ − 1)(1 + c+ λ′)− 2λ′ ]
2[1 + (c+ λ′)2(−2 + c(c+ λ′))]2 .
By using Mathematica (the code is available in the supplementary appendix) we have verified that for all
c < 1.18,
πi
(
λ
′
,λ
′
)
+πj
(
λ
′
,λ
′
)
2 = π
(
λ
′
, λ
′
)
< π
(
λ+c , λ
+
c
)
; i.e., the average payoff to the two players in any
candidate equilibrium in which λi = λj = λ
′
and Ri ·Rj < 1 and si = 1 and sj = Rj is strictly less than
π
(
λ+c , λ
+
c
)
. We derive the analogous expressions for Ui
(
λ
′
, λ
′
)
and Uj
(
λ
′
, λ
′
)
in the supplementary
Mathematica appendix and we show there that for all c < 1.18,
Ui
(
λ
′
,λ
′
)
+Uj
(
λ
′
,λ
′
)
2 = Uc
(
λ
′
, λ
′
)
<
πc
(
λ+c , λ
+
c
)
, which completes the proof.
E.8 Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. In the exposition of this proof, let π1c (λi, λj) denote the payoff to player i in the unique equilibrium
of the partnership game with one-sided reneging costs (in cases where there are multiple equilibria
that may be selected with positive probability by the equilibrium selection function, π1c (λi, λj) denotes
the expected payoff) and use πc(λi, λj) to denote the payoff in the corresponding two-sided case. We
first derive the second-stage best-reply function under one-sided reneging costs. Individuals have an
expectation of their partner’s effort choice, denoted by µχj . Their expected utility function is
Ui(xi, µχj , si, c) = xiµχj −
cx2i
2
− 1si>xi
λi
2
(si − xi)2. (60)
Suppose first that si ≤ µχjc . As the sum of the first two terms of the expected utility function, xiµχj−
cx2
i
2 ,
is maximised when xi =
µχj
c
and the intrinsic cost term, 1si>xi
λi
2 (si−xi)2, is minimised for any xi > si,
we have that the best reply is xi =
µχj
c
. Suppose instead that si >
µχj
c
. There is no intrinsic cost from
playing xi > si but, due to the concavity of utility in xi, there is a loss induced to the material payoff
and so xi = si dominates all xi > si. When a player optimises over xi ∈ [0, si], his optimal choice is
characterised by the same first-order condition and so we have the same best-reply function as in the
case of two-sided reneging costs (given by Eq. (4)). Players therefore always choose pure strategies. The
second-stage best-reply function is therefore:
x∗i (xj , si, sj , λi, λj , c) =


xj
c
if si ≤ xjc
xj + λisi
c+ λi
if si >
xj
c
. (61)
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For expositional convenience and without loss of generality, in writing this best-reply function we have
imposed that players choose pure strategies. We can deduce from the best-reply function the following
facts. (1) In any equilibrium either si > xi or sj > xj i.e., at most one player reneges upwards in
equilibrium. To see why (1) is true, suppose that si ≤ xi and sj ≤ xj . If, for some i, si > xjc , then
x∗i =
xj + λisi
c+ λi
<
c· si + λisi
c+ λi
= si which is a contradiction. If instead si ≤ xjc and sj ≤ xic , then
xi =
xj
c
> xj and xj =
xi
c
> xi, which is also a contradiction. (2) By comparing the best-reply function
to Eq. (4), we see that in any equilibrium in which both players renege downwards, effort choices are the
same function of the player’s message and the opponent’s effort choice as in the model with two-sided
reneging costs and hence equilibrium effort choices when both players renege downwards are the same
function of first-stage messages as in the two-sided model. (3) In any equilibrium in which a player, i,
reneges upwards, we have that si < xi =
xj
c
< xj =
xi + λjsj
c+ λj
< sj , which implies the following effort
choices in equilibrium:
xei (xj , si, sj , λi, λj , c) =
λj
c2 + cλj − 1sj ≡ αisj (62)
xej(xi, si, sj , λi, λj , c) =
λj
c+ λj − 1c
sj ≡ cαisj . (63)
Note that αi < 1. Therefore, a pair of first-stage messages (si, sj) induce a second-stage equilibrium in
which one player, i, reneges upward only if si ≤ αisj . In what follows we show that for any (λi, λj),
αi < Ri. Either Θi ≤ 0, and so by definition Ri =∞ > 1 > αi, or Θi > 0, in which case
αi < Ri ⇐⇒ αi < λj
Θi
⇐⇒ λj
c2 + cλj − 1 <
λj
c(c+ λj) +
1
(c+λi)(c+λj)
− 2
⇐⇒c(c+ λj) + 1
(c+ λi)(c+ λj)
− 2 < c2 + cλj − 1
⇐⇒c2 + cλj + 1
(c+ λi)(c+ λj)
− 2 < c2 + cλj − 1
⇐⇒ 1
(c+ λi)(c+ λj)
< 1, (64)
which always holds as c > 1.
We can now show that for any (λi, λj) the only candidate equilibrium in which both players renege
downward induces the same effort levels as in the unique equilibrium with two-sided reneging costs.
Consider a candidate equilibrium in which both players renege downward, i.e., αisj < si and αjsi < sj .
This implies that si ∈ (αisj ,min{ sjαj , 1}] and sj ∈ (αjsi,min{
si
αi
, 1}]. Lemma 1 implies that in the
two-sided game, conditional on reneging downward, each player i’s best reply is si = min{Risj , 1}.
Given that for both players, i, Risj > αisj and αjsi < 1, their optimal choice of message in the game
with one-sided reneging costs, conditional on reneging downward, must satisfy s∗i = min{Risj , sjαj , 1}. If
min{Ri, Rj} > 1 then this implies s∗i > sj or s∗i = 1 for both players i, and this is jointly satisfied only
if s∗i = s
∗
j = 1, which is the same choice of messages as in the corresponding game with two-sided costs.
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If Ri ·Rj > 1 > Rj , then we have that s∗j = Rjsi. Rearranging s∗j = Rjsi we obtain
si =
sj
Rj
<
sj
αj
(65)
and
si =
sj
Rj
<
sj
Rj
Ri ·Rj = Risj , (66)
where the inequality in Eq. (66) follows given that Ri ·Rj > 1. Eq. (65) and Eq. (66) are consistent with
i’s optimal choice only if s∗i = 1. We therefore have that if Ri · Rj > 1 > Rj then s∗i = 1 > Rjsi = s∗j ,
which implies the same messages and effort choices as in the game with two-sided reneging costs. If
Ri · Rj = 1, a continuum of candidate equilibria survive in which messages satisfy s∗i = s∗j and effort
levels correspond to those in the equilibria of the game with two-sided reneging costs. In the case where
Ri = Rj = 1 we make the assumption, made also in the model with two-sided costs, that the equilibrium
selected is that in which si = sj = 1. Finally, consider the case where Ri · Rj < 1. Assume without
loss of generality that Ri < 1. Given that Ri > αi for both players i, we have that s
∗
i = Risj and
s∗j = min{Rjsi, 1}. Suppose that s∗j = 1; then s∗i = Ri and s∗j = Ri · Rj < 1, which is a contradiction.
Suppose instead that s∗j = Rjsi < 1; then s
∗
i = Risj = Ri · Rj · si < si, which is a contradiction.
Therefore, the only equilibrium candidate in which players renege (weakly) downward is that where
si = sj = xi = xj = 0; i.e., the messages and effort levels are the same as in the unique equilibrium of
the game with two-sided costs. We have therefore seen that in all possible cases, the messages and effort
choices in the unique candidate equilibrium where both players renege downwards are the same as those
in the unique equilibrium of the corresponding game with two-sided reneging costs.
We next show that for any (λi, λj) there are two candidate continua of equilibria (one for each
player), where the effort choices are the same within each continuum, and one player reneges upwards.
Suppose that there is an equilibrium in which player i reneges upward and sj < 1. Player j must
achieve positive utility in equilibrium (otherwise he could do better by playing sj = xj = 0). Since both
players’ effort choices are linear functions of sj , for choices of message that satisfy si ≤ αisj , substituting
these linear functions into the utility function implies that j’s utility is a linear function of s2j whenever
si ≤ αisj . This implies that deviating to sj = 1 yields higher utility for player j. Thus, we are left
with two candidate continua of equilibria in which one player reneges upward. These are strategies that
satisfy (for each player i) si ≤ αisj = αi, with second-stage best replies as given in Eq. (62) and Eq.
(63). Note that the effort levels of the player in any of these candidate equilibria are independent of si
(conditional on its being less than αi) and, therefore, they are the same in all candidate equilibria in the
same continuum. Note by comparing to Eq. (5) that the effort levels of both players are the same as in
all equilibria of the partnership game with two-sided reneging costs where λi = 0.
We now analyse the game with levels of reneging aversion (λ+c , λ
+
c ) and show that there is a unique
equilibrium in which the messages and effort levels are the same as in the two-sided reneging cost game.
We know that the only candidate equilibrium in which both players renege downward must involve the
same choice of messages and effort levels as in the two-sided game. This candidate equilibrium is the
one where si = sj = 1. We now show that this candidate equilibrium is a subgame-perfect equilibrium
by showing that neither player would wish to deviate to any message that would induce them to renege
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upwards in the second stage (i.e., a player, i, would not want to deviate to si ≤ αisj). We obtain the
utility of player i as a function of c, in the candidate equilibrium by substituting λi = λj = λ
+
c and
si = sj = 1 and the equation for second-stage effort levels as a function of first-stage messages (Eq. (5))
into the utility function. Simplifying the resulting expression yields27
Ui(c) =
c(
√
5− 4c− 1) + 2
4
. (67)
We obtain the utility of player i as a function of c in the case where he deviates to si < αi by substituting
sj = 1 and the equations for second-stage effort levels as a function of sj (Eq. (62) and Eq. (63)) into
the utility function. Simplifying the resulting expression yields28
Ui(c) =
c(
√
5− 4c− 2c+ 3)
4
. (68)
Therefore, the deviation is not profitable if
c(
√
5− 4c− 1) + 2
4
>
c(
√
5− 4c− 2c+ 3)
4
⇐⇒2− c > 3c− 2c2 ⇐⇒ 2 + 2c2 > 4c⇐⇒ 1 + c2 > 2c.
This holds for all c ∈ (1, 1.25), and thus with reneging aversion (λ+c , λ+c ) there exists a subgame-perfect
equilibrium with one-sided reneging costs in which si = sj = 1 and si > xi and sj > xj ; i.e., there exists
an equilibrium with messages and effort levels that are the same as those in the standard game with
two-sided costs. The foregoing reasoning also implies that none of the candidate equilibria in which one
player reneges upward are subgame-perfect equilibria. To see this, note first that, for any candidate
equilibrium with (si, sj) such that si < αisj < sj ∈ (0, 1], the utility is equal to the expression in Eq.
(68) multiplied by s2j . Note also that utility from deviating to si = sj is equal to the expression in Eq.
(67) multiplied by s2j . Therefore, player i will deviate from such an equilibrium. Therefore the subgame-
perfect equilibrium with levels of reneging aversion (λ+c , λ
+
c ) is unique and is such that si = sj = 1 and
si > xi and sj > xj and the material payoffs are the same as in the standard game with two-sided
reneging costs and hence π1c (λ
+
c , λ
+
c ) = πc(λ
+
c , λ
+
c ). This completes the proof of parts 1, 3, and 5 of the
proposition.
We now demonstrate that (λ+c , λ
+
c ) remains a strict Nash equilibrium of the population game under
one-sided reneging costs (part 4 of the proposition). We established that for any (λ
′
, λ+c ) with λ
′ 6=
λ+c the only possible equilibria of the one-sided partnership game involve either both players reneging
downward, or exactly one player reneging upward. In the former case, the effort levels are the same as
in the corresponding equilibria of the two-sided game; thus, since π(λ+c , λ
+
c ) > π(λ
′
, λ+c ), we have that
π1c (λ
+
c , λ
+
c ) > π
1
c (λ
′
, λ+c ). In the case where one player, i, reneges upward, the equilibrium effort levels
are of the form given by Eq. (62) and Eq. (63). Note that if any candidate equilibrium yields positive
payoff to a player then the highest possible payoff for that player is obtained in the candidate equilibrium
where sj = 1. By inspection of Eq. (62) and Eq. (63) we see that the equilibrium efforts when sj = 1
27This simplification was obtained using Mathematica. Code available in the supplementary appendix.
28This simplification was obtained using Mathematica. The code is available in the supplementary appendix of this paper.
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are the same as those in the equilibrium of the two-sided game where λi = 0; i.e., if (λi, λj) induces an
equilibrium in which player i reneges upward, then π1c (λi, λj) = πc(0, λj). We know from Theorem 2
that πc(λ
+
c , λ
+
c ) > πc(0, λ
+
c ). Therefore, for any (λi, λ
+
c ) that induces an equilibrium in which player i
reneges upward in the one-sided game, we have that π1c (λi, λ
+
c ) = πc(0, λ
+
c ) < πc(λ
+
c , λ
+
c ) = π
1
c (λ
+
c , λ
+
c ).
Finally, consider any (λi, λ
+
c ) that induces player j to renege upward. In this case, i’s payoff in the most
profitable possible equilibrium is obtained by imposing sj = 1 on Eq. (62) and Eq. (63) and substituting
the resulting expressions into the expression for the material payoff (Eq. (1) yields
[
λi
c+ λi − 1c
]2
(
1
c
− c
2
) =
(c2 − 2)cλ2i
2 (c(c+ λi)− 1)2
. (69)
A deviation from (λ+c , λ
+
c ) that induces such an equilibrium gains a weakly greater payoff only if
(c2 − 2)cλ2i
2 (c(c+ λi)− 1)2
≥ c(
√
5− 4c− 1) + 2
4
,
which never holds for c ∈ (1, 1.25) and29 λi ≥ 0. Therefore, π1(λ+c , λ+c ) > π1(λ
′
, λ+c ) for all λ
′ 6= λ+c
such that (λ
′
, λ+c ) induces an equilibrium in which one player reneges upward. We have therefore seen
that for all (λ
′
, λ+c ), in all possible equilibria of the induced partnership game with one-sided reneging
costs, the payoff achieved by a player with reneging aversion λ
′
is strictly lower than the payoff in the
unique equilibrium under (λ+c , λ
+
c ). Therefore, regardless of the equilibrium selection function underlying
π1c (λ
′
, λ+c ), we have that π
1
c (λ
+
c , λ
+
c ) > π
1
c (λ
′
, λ+c ) for all λ
′ 6= λ+c .
Finally, we show that if c < 1.22, then π1c
(
λ+c , λ
+
c
)
> π1c
(
λ
′
, λ
′
)
for all λ
′ 6= λ+c (point 2 of the
proposition). If λi = λj = λ
′
then min{Ri, Rj} ≥ 1 or Ri · Rj < 1. In the former case, the payoffs are
the same as in the game with two-sided reneging costs, which by point 1 of Theorem 2 are less than
πc
(
λ+c , λ
+
c
)
. In the latter case, there are three possibilities: (1) the payoffs are the same as in the game
with two-sided reneging costs (and both players’ payoffs are zero and therefore less than πc
(
λ+c , λ
+
c
)
);
(2) there is a symmetric pair of continua of equilibria in which one player reneges upward. In one
si = 1 > αj ≥ sj and in the other sj = 1 > αi ≥ si; (3) there exist two continua of equilibria of the
same form as in (2), plus a third equilibrium in which effort levels are zero. If equilibria in which one
player reneges upward exist, these must yield positive payoffs to both players. We show that, whatever
equilibrium selection function is assumed, π1c
(
λ+c , λ
+
c
)
> π1c
(
λ
′
, λ
′
)
. We do this by considering the
equilibrium selection functions that yield the highest possible expected payoff. This is any function
putting full weight on the two equilibria where one player reneges upward (as the payoffs in the third
possible equilibrium are zero for both players). In Section 7 we make the assumption that in cases with
symmetric levels of reneging aversion, if an asymmetric equilibrium is selected, π1c
(
λ
′
, λ
′
)
is the average
of the equilibrium payoffs of players in the two roles (denoted by i and j). To obtain the payoff function
π1c
(
λ
′
, λ
′
)
we therefore impose sj = 1 on Eq. (62) and Eq. (63) and substitute the resulting expressions
into Eq. (1), and its equivalent for player j, to give the payoffs for the two roles. We then take the
29This result was obtained using Mathematica. The code is available in the supplementary appendix of this paper.
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average to yield the payoff:
π1c
(
λ
′
, λ
′
)
=
cα2i
2
+
cα2i
2
− cα
2
i
4
− c
3α2i
4
= cα2i −
(c+ c3)α2i
4
=
(3c− c3)α2i
4
.
We next note that αi is an increasing function of λ
′
and hence the payoff function is increasing in λ
′
.
We therefore consider the limit of the payoff as λ
′ →∞. This is given by
lim
λ
′→∞
(3c− c3)α2i
4
=
(3c− c3)
4
lim
λ
′→∞
[
λ
′
c2 + cλ′ − 1
]2
=
(3c− c3)
4
[
1
c
]2 =
3− c2
4c
.
This is the same payoff that obtained under sequential effort choices (with no reneging costs), as derived
in point 4 of Theorem 2. As shown in Theorem 2, this is strictly less than the payoff πc
(
λ+c , λ
+
c
)
if
c < 1.22, yielding the result.
E.9 Proof of Proposition 4
Fix c ∈ (1, 2). Let 0 < β+c ≡ 12·c + c2 − 1 = 12 ·
(
1
c
+ c
)
− 1. Consider the partnership game with fixed
reneging costs βi = βj = β
+
c . For each player i, let x
∗
i : [0, 1]
2 → [0, 1] be a (pure) second-stage strategy
that satisfies: (1) x∗i (1, 1) = 1 (i.e., a player exerts maximal effort if both players promise maximal
effort), and (2) for each (si, sj) 6= (1, 1), define x∗ in an arbitrary way such that for each pair of messages
(si, sj), the effort x
∗
i (si, sj) is a best reply to the effort x
∗
i (sj , si).
In what follows we show that
(
1, 1, x∗i , x
∗
j
)
is a trembling-hand perfect equilibrium. We begin by
showing that both players exerting maximal effort constitutes a second-stage Nash equilibrium of the
subgame following the promises si = sj = 1. Assume that the opponent exerts maximal effort in this
subgame. If the player exerts maximal effort his payoff is equal to Ui (1, 1, 1, c) = 1−0.5·c. Conditional on
exerting a nonmaximal effort (and reneging on the agent’s promise), the payoff of the agent is maximised
when exerting an effort of 1
c
(by analogous arguments to those presented in Section 3.2), and it is equal
to
Ui
(
1
c
, 1, 1, c
)
=
1
c
− 1
2 · c − β
+
c =
1
2 · c −
(
1
2 · c +
c
2
− 1
)
= 1− c
2
= Ui (1, 1, 1, c) .
Thus, the agent obtains his maximal payoff by exerting maximal effort in this subgame.
Next, we show that in any subgame in which the agent (player i) has promised maximal effort, while
the opponent (player j) has promised less than maximal effort, sj < 1, the agent’s exerted effort is non-
maximal and equal to 1
c
times the opponent’s effort in any second-stage Nash equilibrium of the induced
subgame. In order to see this, observe first that the opponent (player j) will never exert effort xj strictly
higher than max
(
sj ,
1
c
)
< 1 in any Nash equilibrium of this subgame because a strictly higher effort
xj > max
(
sj ,
1
c
)
< 1 yields the agent a suboptimal subjective payoff which is equal to a non-optimal
material payoff minus the reneging cost. Thus, xj < 1 in any Nash equilibrium of the subgame following
messages (1, sj < 1). If the agent keeps his promise and exerts a maximal effort his payoff is equal to
Ui (1, xj , 1, c) = xj − 0.5 · c. Conditional on reneging on his promise, the agent’s best reply is to exert an
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effort of 1
c
· xj , which yields a payoff of
Ui
(
1
c
· xj , xj , 1, c
)
=
1
c
· x2j −
x2j
2 · c − β
+
c =
x2j
2 · c −
(
1
2 · c +
c
2
− 1
)
= 1− c
2
− 1− x
2
j
2 · c .
Observe that the difference in the payoffs, Ui
(
1
c
· xj , xj , 1, c
)
− Ui (1, xj , 1, c), is equal to
Ui
(
1
c
· xj , xj , 1, c
)
− Ui (1, xj , 1, c) = 1− c
2
− 1− x
2
j
2 · c − (xj − 0.5 · c)
= 1− xj − (1− xj) (1 + xj)
2 · c = (1− xj) ·
(
1− 1 + xj
2 · c
)
> 0,
where the latter inequality is due to 1 + xj < 1 + 1 < 2 < 2 · c. This implies that the agent exerts
an effort of 1
c
· xj < xj in any Nash equilibrium an induced subgame following a promise of less than
maximal effort by the opponent.
Next, observe that the opponent’s (player j’s) payoff in any Nash equilibrium of the induced subgame
following a promise of less than maximal effort by the opponent and a promise of maximal effort by the
player (player i) is equal to
Uj
(
xj ,
1
c
· xj , sj , c
)
≤ πi
(
xj ,
1
c
· xj , c
)
=
1
c
· x2j −
c · x2j
2
< 1− 0.5 · c = Uj (1, 1, 1, c) , (70)
which implies that the first-stage best reply of the opponent to the agent’s promise of maximal effort is
to promise maximal effort as well. This shows that
(
(1, 1) ,
(
x∗i , x
∗
j
))
is a subgame-perfect equilibrium of
the partnership game with fixed reneging costs βi = βj = β
+
c . Moreover, observe that Eq. (70) implies
that promising maximal effort is the unique best reply to an agent who promises maximal effort with
a sufficiently high probability (yet, strictly below one), which implies that promising maximal effort
remains the unique best reply also to an agent who plays a slightly perturbed strategy by playing a
full-support strategy that assigns a high probability to the maximal message in the first stage, which
implies that
(
1, x∗i , 1, x
∗
j
)
is a subgame-perfect equilibrium of the partnership game with fixed reneging
costs βi = βj = β
+
c .
E.10 Proof of Proposition 5
We first present two lemmas used in the proof of Proposition 5 before presenting the main proof itself.
Lemma 7. Define max (BRπ (xj)) ≡ max
(
argmaxxi∈[a,b] (π(xi, xj))
)
. Then (1) max (BRπ (xj)) < xj
for each xj > x¯ and (2) max (BRπ (xj)) ≤ x¯ for each xj ≤ x¯.
Proof. Let xj ∈ [0, 1]. We have to show that (1) max (BRπ (xj)) < xj if xj > x¯, and (2) max (BRπ (xj)) ≤
x¯ if xj ≤ x¯. Assume first that xj ∈ [0, x¯]. The fact that x¯ ∈ BRπ (x¯) and the strategic complemen-
tarity imply that max (BRπ (xj)) ≤ x¯. We are left with the case xj > x¯. Assume to the contrary that
max (BRπ (xj)) ≥ xj . Consider the restricted game in which each agent is restricted to choose a strategy
in [xj , 1]. This restricted game admits a symmetric Nash equilibrium (x
′, x′). The strategic complemen-
tarity and max (BRπ (xj)) ≥ xj imply that (x′, x′) is also a Nash equilibrium of the unrestricted game,
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and we get a contradiction to x¯ being the highest equilibrium strategy
Lemma 8. For each xˆ > x¯, there exists ǫ > 0 such that for each xi ≥ xˆ and for each xj ≤ xi, there
exists x′i ≤ xi such that π (x′i, xj) > π (xi, xj) + ǫ.
Proof. Fix xˆ > x¯. For each xi ≥ xˆ and each xj ≤ xi define
f (xi, xj) = max
x′
i
∈[0,xi]
(
πi
(
x′i, xj
)− πi (xi, xj)) .
The fact that π(xi, xj) is continuously differentiable implies that f (xi, xj) is continuous in both param-
eters. Lemma 7 implies that max (BRπ (xj)) ≤ x¯ if xj ≤ c, and max (BRπ (xj)) < xj if xj > x¯. These
inequalities, in turn, imply that f (xi, xj) > 0 for each xi ≥ xˆ and each xj ≤ xi. Define
ǫ˜ = min
xi∈[xˆ,1], xj∈[0,xi]
f (xi, xj) .
The compactness of the set
{
(xi, xj) ∈ [0, 1]2 |xi ∈ [xˆ, 1] , xj ∈ [a, xi]
}
and the continuity of f (xi, xj)
imply that ǫ˜ > 0. Fix xi ∈ [xˆ, 1] and xj ∈ [0, xi]. Let x′i ∈ BRπ (xj). Let ǫ = ǫ˜2 . Then the definition of ǫ˜
implies that
π
(
x′i, xj
)− π (xi, xj) ≥ ǫ˜ > ǫ,
which proves the lemma.
E.10.1 Proof of Proposition 5
Proof. We first prove point (1) (namely, that the equilibrium efforts are at most x¯+ ǫ if λi, λj < λǫ for
some λǫ > 0). Fix ǫ > 0. Lemma 8 implies that there exists δ > 0 such that for each xi ≥ x¯ + ǫ and
each xj ≤ xi there exists x′i ≤ xi such that π (x′i, xj) > π (xi, xj) + δ. Let λǫ be sufficiently small such
that λǫ ·D < δ2 . Assume that there is a pure subgame-perfect equilibrium (−→s ∗,−→x ∗) of the partnership
game with levels of reneging aversion λi, λj ≤ λǫ in which agent i exerts effort of at least x¯ + ǫ, i.e.,
x∗i (
−→s ∗) ≥ x¯+ ǫ. Assume without loss of generality that x∗i (−→s ∗) ≥ x∗j (−→s ∗) . Lemma 8 implies that there
exists x′i satisfying
π(x′i, x
∗
j (
−→s ∗)) > π(x∗i (−→s ∗) , x∗j (−→s ∗)) + δ,
which implies that
U(x′i, x
∗
j (
−→s ∗) , s∗i , λi) > π(x∗i (−→s ∗) , x∗j (−→s ∗)) + δ −
δ
2
> U(x∗i (
−→s ∗) , x∗j (−→s ∗) , s∗i , λi),
where the first inequality is due to λǫ ·D < δ2 . Thus, we get a contradiction to x∗i (−→s ∗) being a second-
stage best-reply against x∗j (
−→s ∗).
We now prove point (2) (namely, that the equilibrium efforts are at most x¯+ ǫ if λi, λj > λǫ). The
fact that π is twice continuously differentiable implies that it is Lipschitz continues, i.e., that there exists
M > 0 such that for each (xi, xj) ,
(
x′i, x
′
j
)
∈ [0, 1]2,
∣∣∣π (xi, xj)− π (x′i, x′j)∣∣∣ < M · (∣∣xi − x′i∣∣+ ∣∣∣xj − x′j∣∣∣) .
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Let ǫ′ > 0 be sufficiently small such that M · ǫ′ < δ4 and ǫ′ < ǫ8 . Let λǫ > 0 be sufficiently large such
that λǫ ·D · ǫ′ > 2 ·M . Assume that there is a pure subgame-perfect equilibrium (−→s ∗,−→x ∗ (−→s )) of the
partnership game with levels of reneging aversion λi, λj ≥ λǫ in which agent i exerts effort of at least
x¯ + ǫ, i.e., x∗i (
−→s ∗) ≥ x¯ + ǫ. Assume without loss of generality that x∗i (−→s ∗) ≥ x∗j (−→s ∗). Lemma 8 c
implies that there exists δ > 0 such that for each x∗i ≥ x¯+ ǫ and each x∗j ≤ x∗i there exists x′i ≤ x∗i such
that π
(
x′i, x
∗
j
)
> π
(
x∗i , x
∗
j
)
+ δ. The fact that λǫ ·D · ǫ′ > 2 ·M implies that x∗j
(
s′i, s
∗
j
)
≥ s∗j − ǫ′ for
each s′i ∈ [0, 1]. This, in turn, implies that
∣∣∣x∗j (s′i, s∗j)− x∗j (s∗)∣∣∣ ≤ 2 · ǫ′ for each s′i ∈ [0, 1] .
Consider the deviation of player i to promising x′i in the first round and exerting effort x
′
i in the
second round. We complete the proof by showing that this deviation induces a higher payoff to the
deviator relative to the equilibrium behaviour (which contradicts (−→s ∗,−→x ∗ (−→s )) being a subgame-perfect
equilibrium):
U
(
(x′i, x
∗
j
(
si = x
′
i, s
∗
j
)
, s∗i , λi)
)
= π(x′i, x
∗
j
(
si = x
′
i, s
∗
j
)
) ≥ π(x′i, x∗j (s∗))−M · 2 · ǫ′ ≥ π(x′i, x∗j (s∗))−
δ
2
≥ π(x∗i , x∗j (s∗))−
δ
2
+ δ ≥ U
(
(x∗i , x
∗
j (s
∗) , s∗i , λi)
)
+
δ
2
.
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